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FINANCIAL ADVICE IN AUSTRALIA: 
PRINCIPLES TO PROSCRIPTION; 
MANAGING TO BANNING 
RICHARD BATTEN† AND GAIL PEARSON‡ 
Australia has put in place a new regulatory system for 
providing advice that modifies existing obligations and 
introduces new requirements.  The three planks of the new 
regime are as follows: (1) a statutory obligation that advisers act 
in the best interests of the client and, in the case of any conflict, 
give priority to the interests of the client; (2) a ban on conflicted 
remuneration; and (3) new arrangements for ongoing fees that 
require the client to opt-in.  This new regime is found in 
consumer protection legislation which does not generally apply 
directly to commercial relationships and wholesale clients.  It is 
changing financial planners’ conduct of business and particularly 
their remuneration models.  Whether it will lead to readily 
available, properly priced, better advice from trusted financial 
planners can only be assessed in the future.  The changes to the 
remuneration and fee rules are more likely to drive change and 
have a bigger impact than the reworked appropriate advice rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† Partner, Minter Ellison Lawyers, Sydney, Australia. He can be contacted on 
+61 2 9921 4712 or at richard.batten@minterellison.com. 
‡ Professor of Business Law, University of Sydney. She can be contacted at 
gail.pearson@sydney.edu.au. The authors wish to thank the organizers and 
participants of the Symposium, Revolution in the Regulation of Financial Advice: 
The U.S., the U.K. and Australia, particularly Professor Arthur Laby. 
This Article contains parallel citations in the Australian format of legal citation to 
ensure that Australian practitioners can easily access the cited sources. The editors 
of the St. John’s Law Review have verified the sources for substance; however, as the 
St. John’s Law Review is unfamiliar with the Australian method of legal citation, the 
editors cannot assert that the form of parallel citation is technically accurate. 
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I. FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE 
Financial advice is vital due to the compulsory 
superannuation system in Australia.1  By law, superannuation 
funds are trusts.2  There is choice of fund, for profit and not-for-
profit funds, self-managed superannuation funds, and payouts of 
large lump sums.  Individuals also use financial advisers to 
access managed funds.  The policy and regulatory vision is that 
individuals should be responsible for market risk,3 though there 
are caveats to this policy.  Australian financial services 
regulation distinguishes between retail clients and others.4  
There are extensive protections specifically for retail clients.5  In 
addition, policy makers and regulators recognize two factors—
limited financial literacy and individual decision-making biases.6  
One solution is to encourage retail clients to use professional 
advisers.  However, certain commentators believe this solution is  
 
 
 
 
1 At the end of 2011 the industry managed 1.4 trillion AUD. AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, 
STRONGER SUPER: INFORMATION PACK, at v (2011). {Treasury, Stronger Super 
Information Pack (21 September 2011) v.} The Productivity Commission estimated 
this at 1.3 trillion AUD and as equivalent to Australia’s gross domestic product 
(“GDP”); it is expected that by 2040 this will be 150% of Australia’s GDP. 
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION DRAFT 
REPORT: DEFAULT SUPERANNUATION FUNDS IN MODERN AWARDS 27 (2012). 
{Australian Government  Productivity Commission, Draft Report—Default 
Superannuation Funds in Modern Awards (June 2012) 27f.} The superannuation 
system is linked to recognizing incentives to save for retirement as Australia does 
not have a universal pension system. 
2 See, e.g., Daniel Mendoza-Jones, Superannuation Trustees: Governance, Best 
Interests, Conflicts of Interest and the Proposed Reforms, 30 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 
297, 298 (2012). {See, for example, Daniel Mendoza-Jones, ‘Superannuation 
Trustees: Governance, Best Interests, Conflicts of Interest and the Proposed 
Reforms’ (2012) 30 Company and Securities Law Journal 297.} 
3 For a summary of the question of where the responsibility should lie, see 
Dimity Kingsford Smith, ASIC Regulation for the Investor as Consumer, 29 
COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 327, 353 (2011) {see D Kingsford-Smith, ‘ASIC Regulation for 
the Investor as Consumer’ (2011) 29 Company and Securities Law Journal 327, 353}. 
4 See generally Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 7 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) Chapter 7.} Section 761 defines providing a financial service to a retail client. 
Id. s 761G. {Ibid s 761G.} 
5 These protections include extensive disclosure about providers and issuers, 
products and advice in financial services guides, product disclosure statements, and 
statements of advice; market conduct rules, and availability of compensation. 
6 See AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4. {Australian 
Government Productivity Commission, Draft Report, above n 1, 4.} 
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contradicted by evidence of advice being given without a 
reasonable basis for that advice,7 conflicted remuneration,8 and 
losses so significant they led to a Parliamentary inquiry.9 
This inquiry identified a number of areas of concern over the 
regulation of financial services, including the inadequacy of 
disclosure and conduct standards, the competency requirements 
for licensees, and the need for enhanced enforcement.  The 
inquiry recommended changes to regulation of the advice 
industry, including an explicit legislative fiduciary duty and 
more targeted financial literacy programs.10  The committee 
noted that remuneration within the industry was incompatible 
with a fiduciary duty.  It proposed that government should 
consult on strategies to remove commissions and, in particular, 
recommended an end to payments from financial product 
manufacturers to financial advisers.11  The key idea was that by 
eliminating commissions and finding a way to ensure advisers  
 
 
7 In a shadow shopping exercise published in 2012, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) found that thirty-nine percent of the sample 
did not meet the legislative requirement to have a reasonable basis for the advice 
and the standard of “appropriate.” AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 279, 
SHADOW SHOPPING STUDY OF RETIREMENT ADVICE 31–33 (2012). {Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Shadow Shopping Study of Retirement 
Advice, Report 279 (March 2012) 31, 33.} On the role that financial advisers played 
in the high profile collapses of Storm Financial and Opes Prime, see 
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON CORPS. & FIN. SERVS., INQUIRY INTO FINANCIAL 
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA 19–67 (2009) [hereinafter RIPOLL REPORT], 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/fps/ 
report/report.pdf {Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services, Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia (‘Ripoll Report’) 
(November 2009) Chapters 3–4 at http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/ 
corporations_ctte/fps/report/report.pdf}. 
8 See Gerard Craddock, The Ripoll Committee Recommendation for a Fiduciary 
Duty in the Broader Regulatory Context, 30 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 216, 216–19 (2012) 
{Gerard Craddock, SC, ‘The Ripoll Committee Recommendation for a Fiduciary Duty 
in the Broader Regulatory Context’ (2012) 30 Company and Securities Law Journal 
216, 216–9}, for a statement of the problem of conflicted remuneration particularly 
as revealed through statements in the Financial Services Guides of financial 
planners. The Financial Services Guide is a mandatory disclosure document that 
must be given by financial services licensees to retail clients. Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 941A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 941A.} 
9 See generally RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7. {Ripoll Report, above n 7.} 
10 See id. at 100–01, 105–06, 150. {Ibid.} For recommended changes to fiduciary 
duty, see id. at 103–06, 150 {Ripoll Report Recommendation 1, 150, 103f, 110f}. For 
recommendations regarding financial literacy programs, see id. at 147, 151 
{Recommendation 11, 151, 147}. 
11 Id. at 127, 151. {Ibid Recommendation 4, 127, 151.} 
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put the interests of the client first, Australians would get better 
advice and would not be led into the types of investment schemes 
that set off the inquiry. 
The new Future of Financial Advice (“FOFA”) rules do not 
specifically define the adviser relationship as fiduciary.  They 
have several components: (1) to act in the best interests of the 
client;12 (2) to follow prescribed steps to meet the best interests 
obligation;13 (3) to reach and give appropriate advice through 
meeting the best interests obligation;14 (4) in case of a conflict of 
interest, to give priority to the interests of the client;15 (5) to ban 
conflicted remuneration, volume-based benefits, shelf fees, and 
asset-based fees on borrowed monies;16 and (6) to require that 
every two years, clients must opt-in to any ongoing fee 
arrangement.17  The first four obligations are linked and 
generally fall on individuals.18  The remuneration rules are not 
restricted to individuals.19 
A. Relationship to Previous Rules 
This new legislation modifies the largely principles-based 
rules of Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act, which date from 2001 
and protect retail clients of financial services.  The new 
legislation contains some completely new rules, replaces others, 
and retains many.  The rules apply to personal advice given to a 
retail client.20 
The replaced rules also required financial services licensees 
to give only “appropriate advice.”  Under these rules, licensees 
had to determine the relevant personal circumstance of the 
client; make reasonable inquiries of those circumstances; with 
regard to the information obtained from the client, consider the 
subject matter of the advice and undertake a reasonable 
 
12 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(1) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 961B(1).} 
13 Id. s 961B(2). {Ibid s 961B(2).} 
14 Id. s 961G. {Ibid s 961G.} 
15 Id. s 961J. {Ibid s 961J.} 
16 Id. ss 963E, 964A, 964D. {Ibid ss 963E, 964A, 964D.} 
17 Id. ss 962K, 962L. {Ibid ss 962K, 962L.} 
18 Id. s 961. {Ibid s 961.} The obligation may fall on a company where it is not 
possible to identify an individual provider and where advice is given through a 
computer. See id. s 961(5), (6). {Ibid s 961(5), (6).} 
19 See, e.g., id. s 963A. {See, for example, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963A.} 
20 Id. ss 766B(3), 761G. {Ibid ss 766B(3), 761G.} 
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investigation of the subject matter of the advice; and, with regard 
to the consideration and the investigation, give “appropriate” 
advice.21  Clients were given a warning if advice was based on 
incomplete or inaccurate information.22  Any such warning was 
given in the mandatory “Statement of Advice.”23  The rules 
required and still require licensees to have “adequate 
arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest.”24  
 
21 Id. s 945A (repealed 2012). {Ibid s 945A (repealed).} In Nguyen v Australian 
Sec. & Invs. Comm’n [2012] AATA 156, ¶¶ 36–39, 59, 92 (Austl.) {Nguyen v 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] AATA 156}, a financial 
adviser with Colonial First State, a subsidiary of the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia, was banned for, among other things, a contravention of section 945A by 
failing to formulate appropriate advice and switching an eighty-three-year-old 
woman out of a safe wholesale income fund into an international property trust and 
a wholesale property securities investment that was higher risk and more volatile 
than fixed interest assets. According to AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, 
REGULATORY GUIDE 175, LICENSING: FINANCIAL PRODUCT ADVISERS—CONDUCT 
AND DISCLOSURE 7 (2011) [hereinafter ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175] {Note 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Licensing: Financial Product 
Advisers — Conduct and Disclosure, Regulatory Guide 175, April 2011 (‘ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 175’) at 175}, 175.16 provided that (a) the providing entity must 
“make reasonable inquiries about the client’s relevant personal circumstances”; 
(b) the providing entity must “consider and investigate the subject matter of the 
advice” as is reasonable in all the circumstances; and (c) the advice must be 
“appropriate” for the client. Also, 175.122 required consideration of the potential 
impact of inappropriate advice on the client, complexity of the advice, and financial 
literacy of the client. ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra, at 36. To ascertain the 
circumstances of the client, 175.125 required looking at the client’s (a) need for 
regular income—for example, retirement income; (b) need for capital growth; 
(c) desire to minimize fees and costs; (d) tolerance of the risk of capital loss, 
especially where this is a significant possibility if the advice is followed; (e) tolerance 
of the risk that the advice, if followed, will not produce the expected benefits; 
(f) existing investment portfolio; (g) need to be able to readily cash-in the 
investment; (h) capacity to service any loan provided in relation to a financial 
product; and (i) tax position, social security entitlements, family commitments, 
employment security, and expected retirement age. Id. at 37. This 2011 Regulatory 
Guide updated earlier versions and has itself been updated in December 2012 and 
October 2013. 
22 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 945B (Austl.) (repealed 2012). {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) s 945B (repealed).} 
23 Id. ss 947B–947C. {Ibid ss 947B (amended), 947C (amended).} 
24 Id. s 912A. {Ibid s 912A.} This obligation is a condition of holding an 
Australian Financial Services Licence. See id. s 912A(1)(aa). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 912A 1(aa).} For a discussion on the management of conflicts of duty and 
interest, see generally AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REGULATORY GUIDE 181, 
LICENSING: MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2004) {Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest, Regulatory 
Guide 181 (‘ASIC Regulatory Guide 181’)}; AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
AUTH., PRUDENTIAL PRACTICE GUIDE DRAFT: SPG 521—CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
(2012) {Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Prudential Practice Guide Draft 
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Licensees must disclose information about relationships with 
others reasonably expected to be capable of influencing the 
providing entity in providing the service25 and must also provide 
information about remuneration, including commissions or other 
benefits.26 
Previously there was a criminal sanction for contravention of 
the pre-existing statutory “appropriate advice” prohibition.27  
Now, a contravention of the best interests and client priority 
rules may result in a civil penalty, an order to compensate the 
client for loss or damage, restitution, and an order declaring the 
contract void.28 
All contracts for the provision of financial services to a 
consumer still contain an implied non-excludable term that the 
services will be rendered with due care and skill, and, if the 
consumer expressly or impliedly makes known the purpose or 
desired results to the person who supplied the service, the 
services will be fit for that purpose or shall be of such quality to 
reasonably achieve that result.29 
The new legislation addresses some of the problems inherent 
in the confusion between sales and advice30 but will not 
necessarily ensure suitable or the best quality advice.31  It may 
 
SPG 521 — Conflicts of Interest (April 2012)}. Inability to recognize a conflict of 
interest goes to suitability to hold a financial services license. Kofkin v. Australian 
Cos. & Sec. Comm’n [2009] AATA 660, ¶ 54 (Austl.). {Kofkin v Australian Companies 
and Securities Commission [2009] AATA 660 at [54].} The view that disclosure has 
been inadequate to manage conflicts of interest informed the Ripoll Report which 
preceded the FOFA legislation. RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 111–12. {Ripoll 
Report, above n 7, 111–2.} 
25 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 942B(2)(f) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 942B(2)(f).} 
26 Id. s 942B(2)(e). {Ibid s 942B(2)(e).} 
27 Id. ss 945A (repealed 2012), 1311(1). {Ibid s 945A (repealed); s 1311(1).} 
28 Id. ss 961K, 961M, 961N. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 961K, 961M, 961N.} 
29 Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12ED (Austl.). 
{Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12 ED.} 
30 GAIL PEARSON, FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW AND COMPLIANCE IN AUSTRALIA 
200 (2009). {G Pearson, Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 200.} The Ripoll Report subsequently asked if 
advice about financial products was a sales industry or an advice industry and noted 
that consumers cannot discern if planners are simply sales agents or independent 
advisers. RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 69, 83. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 69, 83.} 
31 Note ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra note 21, at 34–35 {ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 175, above n 21}, which in 175.113 referred to Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) s 945A (Austl.) (repealed 2012) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 945A 
(repealed)} as a suitability rule, and also in 175.117, said that the advice does not 
have to be ideal, perfect, or best. Yet ASIC proposes that “it would be reasonable to 
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limit some conflicts and will alter some remuneration practices.  
FOFA is attributed with altering the structure of the advice 
industry.32  In some respects it may be no more, and perhaps 
even less, protective than legislation it has replaced. 
B. Availability of Financial Advice 
As well as improving the quality of advice, a declared 
purpose of the new framework is to improve access to financial 
advice.33  This purpose is consistent with regulatory objectives to 
promote confident and informed participation and decision-
 
conclude that advice is appropriate if: (a) it is fit for its purpose—that is, following 
the advice is likely to satisfy the client’s relevant circumstances; and (b) following 
the advice is likely to leave the client in a better position.” AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. 
COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER 182, FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE: BEST 
INTERESTS DUTY AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS—UPDATE TO RG 175, at 19 (2012) 
[hereinafter ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182] (emphasis added). {Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, Future of Financial Advice: Best Interests 
Duty and Related Obligations — Update to RG 175, Consultation Paper 182, 9 
August 2012 (‘ASIC Consultation Paper 182’) 19.} 
32 The industry is consolidating through mergers and acquisitions; more dealer 
groups have become aligned with the big four banks while boutique firms remain, 
resulting in fewer independent groups. Ruth Liew, Mergers Squeeze Financial 
Planner Options, FIN. REV. (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:26 AM), http://www.afr.com/p/ 
personal_finance/portfolio/mergers_squeeze_financial_planner_LwgrKht7xsMM3AE
BLnBV8O. {Ruth Liew, ‘Mergers Squeeze Planner Options’, Australian Financial 
Review (Sydney), 29 August 2012.} This consolidation may signal a move from a 
distribution network to an advice network. 
33 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further 
Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) 3 (Austl.) [hereinafter Further 
FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum], available at 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legis
lation%2Fems%2Fr4739_ems_c1902f04-f76c-455d-87bf-763755860827%22. {Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of 
Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2012 (‘Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum’) 3 at <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p; 
query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fems%2Fr4739_ems_c1902f04-f76c-455d-87bf-76375 
5860827%22>.} But note that in the Parliament, the Minister stated that while the 
legislation would lead to better advice, it was primarily “about regulating conflicts, 
not the intrinsic value of the advice provided.” PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON 
CORPS. & FIN. SERVS., CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT (FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE) 
BILL 2011 AND CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT (FURTHER FUTURE OF FINANCIAL 
ADVICE MEASURES) BILL 2011, at 22 (2012) [hereinafter PARLIAMENTARY JOINT 
COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND REPORT]. {Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial 
Advice) Bill 2011 and Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Bill 2011 (February 2012) (‘Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and 
Report’) 22.} Many Australians do access financial advice. It was estimated that the 
twenty largest licensees had four million clients in 2010, 1.5 million of whom were 
considered active. Id. at 2. {Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report, 2.} 
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making by consumers.34  The financial services regulator, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”), 
views access to quality advice as part of risk regulation, a way to 
reduce risks for consumers and a way to improve market 
competition and efficiency.35  ASIC says that, despite high 
numbers of planners, there is a gap between the advice 
consumers want and the advice which advisers provide.36  
Advisers are generally not specialists—although they may have 
access to specialists—and either want or feel compelled to 
provide comprehensive financial plans for the entirety of a 
client’s financial situation; clients often want targeted or “scaled” 
advice.37  Advisers work from approved product lists linked to 
product platforms but tend to recommend only a few key 
products.38 
 
34 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)(b) 
(Austl.) {Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)(b)}; 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 760A(a) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 760A(a)}. 
35 AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 224, ACCESS TO FINANCIAL 
ADVICE IN AUSTRALIA 4, 7, 10 (2010). {Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Access to Financial Advice in Australia, Report 224 (December 2010) 4, 
7, 10.} 
36 Id. at 29. {Ibid 29.} 
37 Id. at 32–35. {Ibid 32–5.} 
38 The median number of products on a list was 400. AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. 
COMM’N, REPORT 251, REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ADVICE INDUSTRY PRACTICE 7, 23 
(2011). {Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Review of Financial 
Advice Industry Practice, Report 251 (September 2011) 7, 23.} Product platforms 
have been described as “a one-stop shop or supermarket for managed funds and 
other financial instruments.” ECON. LEGISLATION COMM., SENATE, CORPORATIONS 
AMENDMENT (FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE) BILL 2011 [PROVISIONS] AND 
CORPORATIONS AMENDMENT (FURTHER FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE MEASURES) 
BILL 2011 [PROVISIONS], at xi (2012) [hereinafter SENATE ECONOMICS LEGISLATION 
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES]. {The Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporations 
Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011 [Provisions] and Corporations 
Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 [Provisions] 
(March 2012) xi.} On platforms, see generally AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, 
CONSULTATION PAPER 176, REVIEW OF ASIC POLICY ON PLATFORMS: UPDATE TO RG 
148 (2012). {See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Review of ASIC 
Policy on Platforms: Update to RG 148, Consultation Paper 176, March 2012.} RG 
148 is about investor-directed portfolio services. An earlier draft version of the 
legislation included a provision stating that if it was apparent the client required a 
product not on the approved product list, the adviser did not have to investigate that 
product. See Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Bill 2011 (Cth) 
s 961G (Austl.). {See Exposure Draft, Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial 
Advice) Bill 2011 (Cth), s 961G.} 
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Historically, the greatest revenue to planners comes from 
volume-based remuneration paid by a fund manager or a product 
provider.39  In the general community, there is apparently a high 
level of distrust of financial planners.40  There is also a 
significant gap between the cost of advice to planners and the 
amounts consumers are prepared to pay for advice.41  A partial 
explanation may be the range of amounts for which consumers 
want advice.  One of the reasons for the distrust is greater 
realization within the Australian community of remuneration 
models which have depended on commissions paid to advisers, 
including trail commissions.42  Commissions have been identified 
as a factor that leads advisers into conflicts of interest and to 
recommend inappropriate products.43  They have also been touted 
 
39 AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 251, supra note 38, at 11. 
{Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 251, above n 38, 11.} 
40 AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 224, supra note 35, at 60. 
{Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 224, above n 35, 60.} 
The Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation 
spoke of restoring trust. See Marcus Ap, The Future of Financial Advice Reforms: 
Restoring Public Trust and Confidence in Financial Advisers—An Unfinished 
Puzzle, 10 CANBERRA L. REV. 188, 188 (2011). {Marcus Ap, ‘The Future of Financial 
Advice Reforms: Restoring Public Trust And Confidence in Financial Advisers—An 
Unfinished Puzzle’ (2011) 10 (3) Canberra Law Review 188, 188.} This paper also 
comments on the proposal that use of the term “financial planner” or “financial 
adviser” should be restricted to those who are members of a professional standards 
board and on the range of competence within the industry. See id. at 189, 194–95. 
{See 189, 194–5.} 
41 Planners say the average cost is $2,500 to $3,500; consumers are prepared to 
pay on average $301. AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REPORT 224, supra note 35, 
at 47. {Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 224, above n 35, 
47.} 
42 Seven in ten planners receive trailing commissions which are usually about 
0.6% of account balances. See RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17. {Ripoll Report, 
above n 7, 17.} This trailing commission might be in addition to a commission on a 
new investment or contribution of up to four to five percent of the amount invested 
and a volume bonus of up to 0.25% on an account balance. Id. at 27. {Ibid 27.} In 
addition, advisers may receive soft dollar benefits such as holidays and tickets to 
sporting events. Id. at 75 n.16. {Ibid 75.} Some clients may not understand this 
ongoing fee, which means that ongoing fees may be charged without relating to 
current financial advice. PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND REPORT, 
supra note 33, at 27 {Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report, above n 
33, 27}; SENATE ECONOMICS LEGISLATION COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 38, at 12 {Senate Economics Legislation Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services, above n 38, 12}. 
43 The Ripoll inquiry was specifically directed to inquire into commission 
arrangements. The evidence as reported by the committee divides into submissions 
pointing to conflicts and churn from regulators, consumer advocates and not-for-
profit superannuation funds, and submissions from the advice industry arguing that 
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as a cross-subsidy of the cost of advice.44  Policy makers say that 
regulation should ensure investor protection and affordable 
advice.45 
II. THE FIDUCIARY IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 
In Australian law, fiduciary duties are proscriptive, not 
prescriptive.46  They arise because of the existence of obligations 
in the particular instance, not because of the relationship.47  
Australian courts have not provided a statement of when persons 
stand in a fiduciary relationship.48  Justice Jacobsen famously 
said, “[P]erhaps the most than can be said is that a fiduciary 
relationship exists where a person has undertaken to act in the 
interests of another and not in his or her own interests.”49  If a 
 
conflicts can be managed and that commissions subsidize the cost of advice. RIPOLL 
REPORT, supra note 7, at vii, 16–17, 66, 76–77. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, vii 
16,17,66,76f.} 
44 The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, which owns the planner group 
Colonial First State, argued that a full plan costs $3,570, that only three percent of 
superannuation fund members who had recently switched funds were prepared to 
pay this amount, and that commissions as subsidies ensure consumers have access 
to advice. Id. at 77–78. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 77–8.} The extent of existing cross-
subsidization of advice should be examined, and price controls could be considered. 
45 Id. at 75. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 75.} 
46 See, e.g., Pilmer v Duke Grp. Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR 165, 198 (Austl.) {Pilmer v 
Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165 at [74]}; Breen v Williams (1996) 186 
CLR 71, 113 (Austl.) {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 at 113}; Australian Sec. & 
Invs. Comm’n v Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. Pty Ltd. [2007] FCA 963 (Unreported, 
Jacobson, J., 28 June 2007) ¶ 290 (Austl.) {Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114832) No 
4 2007 FCA 963 per Jacobson J}; Aequitas Ltd. v Sparad No. 100 Ltd. [2001] 
NSWSC 14, ¶ 284 (Austl.) {Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 
1006 at [284]}. See Craddock, supra note 8 {Craddock, above n 8}, for a discussion of 
differences in fiduciary law in Australia and the United States. 
47 See generally P.D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS (1977) {P Finn, Fiduciary 
Obligations (Law Book Company, 1977)}; P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in 
EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES, AND TRUSTS (T. G. Youdan ed., 1989) {P Finn, ‘The Fiduciary 
Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Law Book Company, 
1989)}. These sources are often judicially cited. 
48 Breen, 186 CLR at 106 {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 per Gaudron J 
and McHugh J at 106}; Hodgson v Amcor Ltd. (2012) 264 FLR 1, ¶ 1343 (Austl.) 
{Hodgson v Amcor; Amcor v Barnes &Ors [2012] VSC 94 per Vickery J at [1343]}. 
49 Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. Pty Ltd., [2007] FCA ¶ 272. {Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty 
Limited (ACN 113 114832) No 4 [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [272].} However, 
“[f]iduciary obligations often arise in cases where one person is under an obligation 
to act in the interests of another, but that does not mean that the obligation to act in 
the interests of another is a fiduciary obligation.” Aequitas Ltd., [2001] NSWSC 
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fiduciary obligation arises, the proscriptive core is the duty of 
undivided loyalty not to make an unauthorized profit and not to 
have a personal interest—or other duty—that is in conflict with 
the duty.50  At general law, there is no further positive duty “to 
act in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.”51  
The scope of a fiduciary duty will vary according to the nature of 
the relationship and the facts of the case.52  A fiduciary duty can 
co-exist with contractual obligations and may be excluded by 
them.53 
An investment adviser is likely to owe a fiduciary duty to a 
client.54  Former Judge of the Federal Court of Australia, the 
 
¶ 284. {Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 1006; [2001] NSWSC 
14 per Austin J at [284].} 
50 Breen, 186 CLR at 108. {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; [1996] HCA 57 
per Gaudron and McHugh JJ at [41].} This proscriptive core is described as the no-
profit rule and the no-conflict rule. P & V Indus. Pty Ltd. v Porto (2006) 14 VR 1, 
¶ 12 (Austl.) {P &V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto [2006] VSC 131; (2006) 14VR 1 at 
[12]}; see also Kevin Lindgren, Fiduciary Duty and the Ripoll Report, 28 COMPANY & 
SEC. L.J. 435, 441 (2010) {see also K Lindgren, ‘Fiduciary Duty and the Ripoll 
Report’ (2010) 28 Company and Securities Law Journal 435, 441}. 
51 Breen, 186 CLR at 113. {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71; [1996] HCA 57 
per Gaudron and McHugh JJ at [41].} 
52 Id. at 82–83 {Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71}; Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S. 
Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, 49 (Austl.) {Hospital Products Ltd v United States 
Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41}. 
53 Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. Pty Ltd., [2007] FCA ¶ 276 {Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty 
Limited (ACN 113 114832) No 4 [2007] FCA 963}; Aequitas Ltd., [2001] NSWSC 
¶ 283 {Aequitas Ltd v AEFC Leasing Pty Ltd (2001) 19 ACLC 1006 per Austin J at 
[287]}; see Peter Devonshire, Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 32 
SYDNEY L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2010) {see P Devonshire, ‘Account of Profits for Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 389, 393–4} (discussing limitations 
to contractual exclusion of fiduciary obligations and the inference that this may be 
limited to fiduciary relations between commercial parties). 
54 Daly v Sydney Stock Exch. Ltd. (1986) 160 CLR 371, 385 (Austl.) {Daly v The 
Sydney Stock Exchange (1986) 160 CLR 371; 1986 HCA 25}; Citigroup Global Mkts. 
Austl. Pty Ltd., [2007] FCA ¶ 272–85 {Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114832) No 
4 [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J [282]–[285]}; Tomasetti v Brailey [2011] NSWSC 
1446, ¶ 543 (Austl.) {Tomasetti v Brailey [2011] NSWSC 1446}; Brown v Australian 
Sec. & Invs. Comm’n [2009] AATA 286, ¶ 151 (Austl.) {Brown v Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (2009) 108 ALD 625; [2009] AATA 286}. In Hadid v 
Lenfest Commc’ns Inc. [1999] FCA 1798, ¶ 817 (Austl.) {Hadid v Lenfest 
Communications Inc [1999] FCA 1798 per Lehane J [817]}, Justice Lehane said: 
“[A]dvisers may, and often do, have fiduciary obligations” and:  
[t]here is little doubt that the principle extends more broadly in the case of 
advisers whose task it is to counsel ‘an advised party as to how his 
interests will or might best be served in a matter which our society 
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Honorable Kevin Lindgren QC, points out that a fiduciary duty 
does not concern the quality or the very best advice.55  Lindgren 
says that prescriptive statutory requirements imposed on 
professionals are akin to a common law duty to exercise 
reasonable care and skill, breach of which will result in 
negligence.56  In other words, they are “quasi-tortious.”57  The 
obligation to disclose, he says, is not fiduciary per se, but linked 
to the defense to equitable damages for breach of the no-profit, 
no-conflict rule which, unlike common law damages, will not be 
restricted to the loss to the beneficiary but will include the profit 
made by the fiduciary.58  By way of contrast with fiduciary law, 
the prescriptive regulation of advisers requires them to act in a 
certain way.  The legislative proscription of particular forms of 
remuneration is a further departure from classic fiduciary law. 
The language of a statutory “best interests” duty in Australia 
derives from the trust context of superannuation regulation and 
the duties of responsible entities of managed funds.  Along with 
fiduciary duties, a trustee of a superannuation fund has a 
statutory duty to act in the best interests of all beneficiaries of a 
fund.59  A responsible entity must act in the best interests of 
 
considers to be of importance to the advised’s personal or financial well-
being’ . . . . 
Id. (quoting Paul Finn, Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World, in 
COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 7, 10–11 (Ewan 
McKendrick ed., 1992) {Finn, “Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World” in 
[E McKendrick, Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, 1992], pp 
10, 11’}). 
55 See Lindgren, supra note 50, at 438. {Lindgren, above n 50, 435, 436–8.} 
However, note that in Daly, 160 CLR at 385 {Daly v the Sydney Stock Exchange 
(1986) 160 CLR 371; [1986] HCA 25}, Justice Brennan said that in the case of a 
financial adviser who gives advice on an investment in which the adviser has a 
financial interest the duty is “to give the best advice which the adviser could give.” 
56 See Lindgren, supra note 50, at 436–38. {Lindgren, above n 50, 435–6, 438.} 
57 Pilmer v Duke Grp. Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR 165, 197–98 (Austl.). {Pilmer v Duke 
Group ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165 at [74].} 
58 Lindgren, supra note 50, at 435, 438. {Lindgren, above n 50, 435, 438.} 
59 See Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(2)(c) (Austl.). 
{Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(2)( c ).} There is also a 
statutory obligation that company directors should act in good faith and in the best 
interests of the company. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1)(a) (Austl.). 
{Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1)(a).} Litigation has tended to concern associated 
obligations to act for a proper purpose. See, e.g., Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n v 
Adler [2002] NSWSC 171, ¶ 8 (Austl.). {See, for example, ASIC v Adler [2002] 
NSWSC 171.} In Adler, Justice Santow referred to the statutory business judgment 
rule as a “safe harbour,” language also used by ASIC to describe the best interests 
steps by financial advisers in section 961B(2). Id. {Ibid} 
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members and, in the case of a conflict, give priority to members’ 
interests.60  The superannuation provision is concerned with the 
discretionary powers of the trustee.  The fiduciary duty and the 
statutory duty have been treated as coterminus, importing the 
equitable duty into a statute.  It has been held that this 
superannuation statutory duty imposes no higher standard on a 
trustee than that of the general law,61 and that the general law 
obligation could be expressed as it is in the language of the 
statute.62  Unlike the trustee of a superannuation fund, a 
financial adviser in the capacity of giving advice is not a trustee, 
and it is unlikely that the financial adviser’s statutory duty is 
identical to a fiduciary duty. 
The lack of clarity surrounding the best interests duty is 
compounded by ASIC, which assumes that the new FOFA laws 
express a legislative fiduciary duty,63 yet at the same time 
intends to administer the best interests duty in the light of other 
obligations, which may include “common law obligations such as 
the duty of care and fiduciary duties.”64 
Two recent Federal Court decisions found breaches of 
fiduciary duty in circumstances of financial advice.65  Both 
involved the sale of complex financial products to relatively 
unsophisticated local government councils in the lead up to the 
 
60 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601FC(1)(c) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 601FC (1)(c).} 
61 Invensys Austl. Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd. v Austrac Invs. Ltd. (2006) 198 
FLR 302, 323–24, ¶¶ 102–07. {Invensys Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v 
Austrac Investments Ltd [2006] VSC 112; [2006] 15 VR 87 at[102]-[107].} Cowan v 
Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750 (Austl.) {Cowan v Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750} analyzes 
the duties of a trustee of a pension fund; but as with superannuation funds, this 
concerns the power to invest, not the giving of advice. 
62 Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corp. Pty Ltd. 
(2011) 282 ALR 167, ¶ 121 (Austl.). {Manglicmot v Commonwealth Bank Officers 
Superannuation Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 204 per Giles JA at [121].} 
63 See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 6–7. {ASIC 
Consultation Paper 182, above n 31, 6–7.} For a critique of ASIC’s approach to 
fiduciary law, see Craddock, supra note 8, at 221 {see Craddock, above n 8, 221}. 
64 See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 12. {ASIC 
Consultation Paper 182, above n 31, 12.} 
65 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Bros. Austl. Ltd. [2012] FCA 1028, 
¶¶ 932–46 (Austl.) {Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd 
(in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 at [932]–[946]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council v Local Gov’t Fin. 
Servs. Pty Ltd. (No. 5) [2012] FCA 1200, ¶¶ 2278–84 (Austl.) {Bathurst Regional 
Council v Local Government Financial Services. Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200}. 
These cases were decided subsequent to the written Article presented at the 
Symposium. 
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2008 financial crisis.66  The advice was pursuant to contractual 
and non-contractual arrangements.67  Although a fiduciary duty 
arises as an incident of a particular relationship and can be 
modified by contract, both cases establish that a financial adviser 
owes a fiduciary duty to those with whom it deals.68  These 
decisions contrast with the decision concerning a rating agency in 
so far as it assigns a rating.  In Bathurst Regional Council v 
Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd., the court held 
that when a rating agency assigns a rating, this does not of itself 
create a fiduciary relationship, and further, that a rating is an 
expert opinion, not advice.69  In both cases, the financial advisors 
failed to sufficiently disclose conflicts of interest and the extent to 
which they would benefit from the transactions.70 
III. BEST INTERESTS AND APPROPRIATE ADVICE 
The FOFA legislation distinguishes between a duty in 
relation to the advice and the standard of the advice; the adviser 
must act in the best interests of the client and the advice must be 
appropriate to the client.71  The relationship between the acts of 
the adviser and the standard of the advice is that the adviser 
meets the standard of appropriate advice by acting in the best 
 
66 See Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 30–695 {See Wingecarribee 
Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 per Rares 
J at [30]–[695]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 1–24 {Bathurst Regional 
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 per 
Jagot J at [1]–[24]}. 
67 See Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 30–695 {see Wingecarribee 
Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 per Rares 
J at [30]–[695]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 1–24 {Bathurst Regional 
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 per 
Jagot J at [1]–[24]}. 
68 See Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 729–30, 733 {see 
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 
1028 per Rares J at [729], [730], [733]}; Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶ 2314 
{Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) 
[2012] FCA 1200 at [2314]}. 
69 Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 2528, 2534, 2789–90. {Bathurst 
Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 
1200 per Jagot J at [2528], [2534], [2789], [2790].} 
70 Wingecarribee Shire Council, [2012] FCA ¶¶ 939, 941 {Wingecarribee Shire 
Council v Lehmann Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 at [939], [941]}; 
Bathurst Reg’l Council, [2012] FCA ¶ 50 {Bathurst Regional Council v Local 
Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 at [50]}. 
71 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 961B(1), 961G (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) ss 961B(1), 961G.} 
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interests of the client.72  Thus, the standard of the advice is 
judged by reference to the acts of the adviser, not by the nature of 
the resulting advice.  There is no obligation to provide advice that 
is “best” for the client.  The new statutory obligation is different 
from a fiduciary duty as it operates in Australia and may fall 
short of the pre-existing obligation to provide appropriate 
advice.73 
If there is a conflict of interest between the interests of the 
provider and the interests of the client, there is an obligation for 
the adviser to give priority to the interests of the client.74  There 
is also an obligation to warn the client if the advice is based on 
information that is inadequate or incomplete.75 
An adviser may fulfill the best interests duty and thus 
provide appropriate advice by completing all of the best interests 
steps prior to giving the advice.76  The legislation does not 
indicate that this way is the only way to fulfill the best interests 
duty.  It is possible to provide advice without having completed or 
having inadequately completed the best interests steps.77  It is 
unclear how an adviser may satisfy the best interests duty in an 
alternate way.78  The best interests steps themselves do not 
 
72 Id. s 961G. {Ibid s 961G.} 
73 Andrew J. Serpell, The Future of Financial Advice Reforms, 30 COMPANY & 
SEC. L.J. 240, 251(2012) {A Serpell, ‘The Future of Financial Advice Reforms’ (2012) 
30 Company and Securities Law Journal 240 at 251} suggests the significant 
difference is that a contravention of the now repealed section 945A entailed a 
criminal offense. Section 945A was repealed in Corporations Amendment (Further 
Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 cl 6 (Austl.) {Section 945A 
was repealed in Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice 
Measures) Act 2012 Schedule 1 cl 6}. 
74 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 961J.} This obligation is different from the Australian financial services license 
obligation which requires a licensee to have adequate arrangements in place to 
manage conflicts of interest. Id. s 912A(1)(aa). {Ibid s 912A(1)(aa).} This “statutory 
requirement is to be contrasted with the duty in equity of a fiduciary to eliminate or 
avoid conflicts.” See Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n v Citigroup Global Mkts. Austl. 
Pty Ltd. [2007] FCA 963, ¶¶ 311, 441. {Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited (ACN 113 114832) No 
4 [2007] FCA 963 per Jacobson J at [311], see also [441]f.} 
75 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961H (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 961H.} 
76 Id. s 961B(2). {Ibid s 961B(2).} 
77 See id. s 961B(1). {Ibid s 961B(1).} 
78 ASIC is yet to give any guidance on complying with the best interests duty 
without completing the steps in s 961B(2) in its Consultation Papers. Since this duty 
is a positive duty to act, the proscriptive no-conflict, no-profit approach may be 
insufficient. A court may look to the content of a fiduciary duty. For instance, in 
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positively require advice to be based on accurate and complete 
information.79  The provider must undertake each of the steps to 
meet the best interests obligation via this route.80  The standard 
in taking each step is tort-like.  It references the existing 
reasonable expertise of the industry in making judgments about 
the best interest of the client.81  If a provider with a reasonable 
level of expertise would take a step, then it is in the best 
interests of the client.  This standard does not go directly to the 
advice given to the client; it goes to the judgments made by the 
adviser in advising the client.82  It goes to process, not outcome.83  
The Explanatory Memorandum for FOFA states that these best 
interests steps are not envisaged as an “exhaustive and 
mechanical checklist,”84 which is consistent with the inclusion of  
 
 
 
 
 
Daly v. Sydney Stock Exchange, the duty was to furnish clients with all relevant 
knowledge concealing nothing relevant to making the investment decision. Daly v. 
Sydney Stock Exchange (1986) 160 CLR 371, 385 (Austl.). {Daly v the Sydney Stock 
Exchange (1986) 160 CLR 371 per Brennan J at [385]; [1986] HCA 25.} A court may 
also look at other statutory provisions which require acting in best interests. In 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v. Maxwell, Justice Brereton said 
“a breach of the obligation to act bona fide in the interests of the company involves a 
consciousness that what is being done is not in the interests of the company, and 
deliberate conduct in disregard of that knowledge.” Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n 
v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373, ¶ 107. {Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission v Maxwell [2006] NSWSC 1052 per Brereton J at [107].} These different 
approaches will need to be resolved. 
79 This situation is quite different from the obligation, in separate legislation, 
imposed on intermediaries, who are finance brokers, or “credit assistants,” and 
provide suggestions about consumer credit products. See National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 8 (Austl.). {National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
(Cth) 2009.} 
80 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 961B(2).} 
81 Id. s 961E. {Ibid s 961E.} 
82 Id. s 961B(2)(f). {Ibid s 961B(f).} 
83 There is an untested assumption that “good processes will improve the 
quality of the advice that is provided.” See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum, supra note 33, at 10. {See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum, above n 33, 10, [1.23].} In contrast, ASIC warns that advice should 
leave clients in a better position. See ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra note 21, 
at 47 {ASIC Regulatory Guide 175, above n 21, 175.A27–28}; ASIC CONSULTATION 
PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 12 {ASIC Consultation Paper 182, above n 31}. 
84 See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 
10. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 10, [1.25].} 
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the last step requiring the adviser to take “any other step 
that . . . would reasonably be regarded as being in the best 
interests of the client.”85 
The provider should first identify the following: (1) the 
objectives, financial situation, and needs of the client86—but 
there is no obligation to go beyond the client’s instructions or to 
verify the information; (2) the subject matter of the advice sought 
by the client—either explicitly or implicitly;87 (3) the 
circumstances of the client that are relevant to the advice sought 
on that subject matter—that is, a filtering of the client objectives, 
financial situation, and needs.88 
If it is reasonably apparent that information about the 
client’s relevant circumstances is incomplete or inaccurate, the 
provider must make reasonable inquiries to obtain complete and 
accurate advice.89  The legislation provides a standard akin to a 
tort duty of care to determine whether something is reasonably 
apparent.90  There is no legislative indication of what reasonable  
 
 
 
85 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(g) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 961B(2)(g).} The inclusion of this step means that the steps do not provide a 
“safe harbour” for advisers, although ASIC’s draft guidance on this step suggests 
that ASIC only has limited expectations of what an adviser would need to do to 
satisfy this requirement. ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 57–59 
{ASIC Consultation Paper 182, above n 31}; ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 175, supra 
note 21, at 69–86 {ASIC Regulatory Guide 175, above n 21,175.A110-A113}. 
86 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(a) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 961B(2)(a).} 
87 Id. s 961B(2)(b)(i). {Ibid s 961B(2)(b)(i).} 
88 Id. s 961B(2)(ii). {Ibid s 961B(2)(b)(ii).} The Explanatory Memorandum says 
explicitly that this process is to accommodate limited or scaled advice. See Further 
FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12. {Further FOFA 
Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12, [1.35].} 
89 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(c) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 961B(2)(c).} 
90 “Something is reasonably apparent if it would be apparent to a person with a 
reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter of the advice that has been sought 
by the client, were that person exercising care and objectively assessing the 
information given to the provider by the client.” Id. s 961C. {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 961C.} This test is not dissimilar to the notion of peer professional opinion in 
the Civil Liability Act. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5O. {See Civil Liability 
Act (NSW) s 5 O.} The Explanatory Memorandum says that this test is an objective 
test based on the standards of the industry and the subject matter of the advice, 
which will vary according to the complexity of the advice. Further FOFA Bill 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12. {Further FOFA Bill 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12 [1.37].} 
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inquiries might entail.  The obligation is the making of the 
inquiry.  There is no obligation that the information actually be 
complete and accurate.91 
Having done this, the provider must then ask a question of 
himself or herself:  Does he or she have the expertise to give 
advice on the subject matter concerned?  If not, the adviser must 
decline to give advice.92  There is no specific provision dealing 
with the possibility that a provider may overestimate his or her 
expertise.93  Next, if it would be reasonable to consider 
recommending a financial product to the client on the subject 
matter of the advice sought by the client, the provider must 
conduct an investigation of possible financial products,94 assess 
the information gleaned by this investigation,95 and base all 
judgments in advising the client on the circumstances of the 
client.96  The matter at issue here is the nature of the 
investigation.  The investigation is into products for those 
filtered, relevant circumstances identified by the provider, but it 
does not require an investigation into “every financial product 
available.”97  However, if the client asks the provider to consider 
a specified financial product, then this product must be included 
in the investigation.98  Finally, in actually advising the client, the 
provider must base all judgments on the client’s relevant 
circumstances.99 
There is a carve-out from the best interests steps for two 
types of products.  If the subject matter of the advice is a basic 
banking product or a general insurance product, the providers do 
not have to assess their own competence, investigate products to 
 
91 Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 12. 
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12, [1.36].} 
92 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2)(d) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 961B (2)(d).} 
93 Australian financial services licensees must maintain their competence to 
provide the service for which they are licensed and ensure that their representatives 
are adequately trained and competent. Id. s 912A(1)(e), (f). {Ibid s 912A (1)(e)(f).} 
94 Id. s 961B(2)(e)(i). {Ibid s 961B (2)(e)(i).} 
95 Id. s 961B(2)(e)(ii). {Ibid s 961B (2)(e)(ii).} 
96 Id. s 961B(2)(f). {Ibid s 961B (2)(f).} 
97 They must conduct an investigation into products that might “achieve those of 
the objectives and meet those of the needs of the client that would reasonably be 
considered as relevant to advice on that subject matter.” Id. ss 961B(2)(e)(i), 
961D(1). {Ibid ss 961B(2)(e)(i); 961D(1).} 
98 See id. s 961D(2) {Ibid s 961D(2)} (stating no indication of how specific a 
specified financial product must be). 
99 Id. s 961B(2)(f). {Ibid s 961B(2)(f).} 
FINAL_BATTEN & PEARSON 2/27/2014  6:25 PM 
2013] FINANCIAL ADVICE IN AUSTRALIA 529 
achieve the aims of the client, base judgments on the client’s 
circumstances, or take other reasonable steps.  They, however, 
must still take the first three steps, which include identifying the 
client’s objectives, identifying the subject matter of the advice, 
and if necessary, making inquiries to obtain further 
information.100 
The best interests steps have been criticized for promoting 
perfunctory compliance and possibly leading to outcomes that 
would fail a common law test of the duty of care of a financial 
adviser.101  ASIC itself describes the best interests steps as a 
“safe harbour.”102 
If it is clear that the information on which advice is based is 
incomplete or inaccurate, the provider can still give advice but 
must warn the client.103  This warning must be given at the same 
time as the advice is given, must state that the advice is 
incomplete or inaccurate in relation to the relevant 
circumstances of the client and must also state that before acting 
on the advice, the client should consider whether it is 
appropriate.104  This warning suggests that, notwithstanding the 
obligation to give only appropriate advice,105 clients still have to 
ask themselves if the advice is appropriate, because in some 
circumstances it may not be.  Some providers may make 
inquiries and obtain information requested, but as a failsafe they 
may still give a warning. 
This provision is different from the earlier obligation to warn 
if advice was based on incomplete or inaccurate information.  The 
new provision rests on it being “reasonably apparent” that the 
 
100 Id. s 961B(2)–(4). {Ibid ss 961B(2)–(4).} 
101 See Craddock, supra note 8, at 235. {Craddock, above n 8, 235.} The question 
here is not whether a duty of care exists but the scope of that duty. Does it require 
an adviser to seek out investment opportunities or simply draw the client’s attention 
to opportunities of which the adviser is aware? This distinction is discussed in 
Aequitas Ltd. v. Sparad No. 100 Ltd., in which the latter was preferred. Aequitas 
Ltd. v. Sparad No. 100 Ltd. [2001] NSWSC 14, ¶ 82 (Austl.). {Aequitas v Aefc [2001] 
NSWSC 14 per Austin J at [82].} It is important to recognize, however, that the best 
interests steps do override common law duties where they apply. See ASIC 
CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 12–13. {See ASIC Consultation Paper 
182, above n 31, [30].} 
102 ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 10. {ASIC Consultation 
Paper 182, above n 31, 17.} 
103 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961H (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 961H.} 
104 See id. s 961H(1), (2). {Ibid ss 961H(2), 961H(10)(a)(b).} 
105 See id. s 961G. {Ibid s 961G.} 
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information is incomplete or inaccurate.  Under the old provision, 
the obligation arose if the providing entity knew the information 
was incomplete or inaccurate, or was reckless as to whether it 
was incomplete or inaccurate.106 
A. Priority to the Client 
The obligation to give priority to the interests of the client 
complements the obligation of the provider to act in the best 
interests of the client, which may involve the process of the best 
interests steps at the level of care of a person with a reasonable 
level of expertise.107  Unlike the licensee requirement to manage 
conflicts, this requirement falls on the individual advice provider.  
The obligation arises only if the provider knows or should know 
there is a conflict between the interests of the client and 
others.108  The legislation has no definition of conflict of interest 
and the examples in the Explanatory Memorandum concern 
payments.109 
The rules target those beyond the adviser whose interests 
may be in conflict with the client.  They are specifically listed and 
include the provider and his or her associates, financial services 
licensee and associates, and authorized representatives of the 
licensee and associates.110  Again, there is a carve-out for basic 
banking products and general insurance products.111 
A provider may still charge for services at a market rate and 
in some circumstances may still accept a commission.112  ASIC 
proposes that to comply with the priority rule, advisers should 
consider what amounts to a “no conflicts” approach and ask 
“what an advice provider without a conflict of interest would 
do.”113 
 
106 Id. s 945B (repealed 2012). {Ibid s 945B (repealed).} 
107 See id. s 961J. {Ibid s 961J.} 
108 Id. s 961J(1). {Ibid s 961J(1).} 
109 See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 
19. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 19, [1.67]–
[1.68].} 
110 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J(1)(a)–(f) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) ss 961J(1)(a)–(f).} 
111 Id. s 961J(2), (3). {Ibid ss 961J(2)–961J(3).} 
112 See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 
19. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 19, [1.67]–
[1.68].} 
113 See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 182, supra note 31, at 21. {ASIC 
Consultation Paper 182, above n 31, 21.} 
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B. Limited or Scaleable Advice 
The scope of the financial adviser’s obligation to the client 
will depend on what the client wants and the arrangements 
between the client and the adviser.  Scaleable advice is personal 
advice that is limited in scope.114  ASIC reports that more clients 
want advice on a case-by-case basis and are not looking for 
comprehensive advice; financial planners fear that if they give 
such piecemeal advice they may fall afoul of the rule to act in the 
best interests of the client.115  The Explanatory Memorandum 
clearly says that step two, identifying the subject matter of the 
advice sought by the client, is to facilitate both scaled, limited, 
targeted, and specific advice on a single matter as well as 
comprehensive, holistic advice.116  But it warns:  “The scaling of 
advice by the provider must itself be in the client’s best interests, 
especially since the client’s instructions may at times be unclear 
or not appropriate for his or her circumstances.”117 
In the situation where a client is unable to easily identify the 
subject matter of the advice he or she wants, the Explanatory 
Memorandum says advisers should discuss this subject matter 
with the client.  This conversation should be about what subject 
matter for advice would be in the client’s best interests, also 
taking into account how much the client wishes to pay for the 
advice and the client’s overall circumstances.118  Again, the 
Explanatory Memorandum warns that the adviser cannot escape 
these difficulties simply by stating in the contract that the 
subject matter is as requested by the client and therefore is in 
the best interests of the client.119  ASIC warns that all advice, 
scaled or otherwise, should leave clients in a better position and 
emphasizes the importance of the judgment of the adviser, 
 
114 AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, CONSULATION PAPER 183, GIVING 
INFORMATION, GENERAL ADVICE AND SCALED ADVICE 7 (2012) [hereinafter ASIC 
CONSULTATION PAPER 183]. {Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
Giving Information, General Advice and Scaled Advice, Consultation Paper 183, 
August 2012 (‘ASIC Consultation Paper 183’) 7.} 
115 Id. at 8 {Ibid 8}; see PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND 
REPORT, supra note 33, at 55 {Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report, 
above n 33, 55}. 
116 See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 
12. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 12, [1.34].} 
117 Id. {Ibid.} 
118 Id. at 11–12. {Ibid 11, [1.33].} 
119 Id. at 11. {Ibid.} 
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including, in some circumstances, declining to give advice.120  
ASIC admonishes that important issues, such as debt on 
retirement or insurance attached to superannuation, should not 
be omitted because they are too difficult to resolve.121  The 
interplay among elucidating the subject matter of the advice, the 
relevant circumstances of the client, and the best interests of the 
client does not seem to facilitate the scaling of advice that ASIC 
reports clients want and instead may challenge some advisers. 
C. Falling Short of a Fiduciary Duty 
One commentator’s main objections to the legislation are 
“legal incoherence” and its capacity to hinder the development 
and application of both common law and fiduciary law to 
financial advisers.122  Craddock believes that the best interests 
obligation adds little to the existing obligation to provide 
appropriate advice; there is a clear intention to create a statutory 
fiduciary duty which has miscarried; and the steps to satisfy the 
best interests requirement are probably less than required to 
satisfy the common law duty of care expected of a financial 
adviser.123  He also argues that the persistence of conflicts is not 
overcome by the rule to prioritize the client in case of conflicts.124  
It is possible that the statutory best interests, appropriate 
advice, and client priority duties may alter some product 
recommendations.  The jury is out on whether, by themselves, 
these duties will enhance the quality of advice. 
 
120 See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 183, supra note 114, at 27, 29, 31. {ASIC 
Consultation Paper 183, above n 114, 27, 29, 31.} Judgment is important as the 
legislation also provides for the possibility of advice via a computer program. See 
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE INQUIRY AND REPORT, supra note 33, at 57. {See 
discussion in Parliamentary Joint Committee Inquiry and Report, above n 33, 57.} 
121 See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 183, supra note 114, at 31. {ASIC 
Consultation Paper 183, above n 114, 31.}  
122 Craddock, supra note 8, at 236. {Craddock, above n 8, 236f.} 
123 Id. at 234–35. {Ibid 234–5.} For a further discussion of the best interests duty 
as a duty of care and not a fiduciary duty, see PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE 
INQUIRY AND REPORT, supra note 33, at 47 {see Parliamentary Joint Committee 
Inquiry and Report, above n 33, 47}. 
124 Craddock, supra note 8, at 236 {Craddock, above n 8, 236} (contrasting the 
statutory duty with the fiduciary no conflicts rule). Of course, the difference is that 
the fiduciary duty can be managed through informed consent which is not possible 
under the statutory duty. 
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IV. CONFLICTED REMUNERATION 
Of all the FOFA changes, the ban on conflicted remuneration 
arguably has the biggest impact on the financial services sector 
in Australia.  The introduction of the best interests duty and 
related provisions is a significant step in the process of raising 
professional standards for financial advisers, but most advisers 
and licensees believe that they are currently acting in their 
client’s best interests and regard this change as more iterative 
than revolutionary.  The opt-in and fee disclosure elements of 
FOFA have certainly been the most controversial changes and 
will have significant implications for adviser-client relations.  
However, these changes will not have as large an impact on 
relationships between industry participants.  By contrast, the 
conflicted remuneration prohibitions are leading to a complete 
transformation of the commercial relationships between advisers 
and licensees, licensees and issuers, and platforms and fund 
managers.  Licensees are struggling to develop compliant models 
of remuneration, which effectively align adviser and licensee 
interests to incentivize adviser conduct in relation to existing and 
new clients. 
This impact on commercial relationships differentiates 
FOFA from other major reforms in the financial services sector in 
the past, including the introduction of the financial services 
licensing and disclosure regime from 2001 to 2003, the 
implantation of upgraded anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorism financing legislation from 2006 to 2008, and the 
introduction of consumer credit licensing and suitability 
obligations in 2009.  These changes imposed significant 
compliance burdens on the industry.  However, the impact 
mainly affected back office compliance arrangements and retail 
disclosure.  Unlike FOFA, they did not require significant 
adjustment of remuneration arrangements or business models. 
There are a number of key elements to the ban on conflicted 
remuneration.  First, the ban applies to licensees and also to 
advisers directly when accepting remuneration.  Licensees must 
take reasonable steps to ensure that their representatives do not 
accept conflicted remuneration.125  Second, it also applies to 
employers of advisers and product issuers paying 
 
125 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963E, 963F (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) ss 963E, 963F.} 
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remuneration.126  Third, there is a general ban on remuneration 
which could reasonably be expected to influence retail advice and 
a presumption that volume-based payments will influence 
advice.127  Fourth, the ban applies to both monetary and non-
monetary benefits.128  Fifth, there are certain exceptions, in 
particular for insurance and banking products and for certain 
types of “soft dollar” benefits.129  Sixth, there are specific bans on 
platform operators accepting shelf-space fee payments from fund 
managers and charging asset-based fees on borrowed amounts.130  
Seventh, grandfathering of existing arrangements is permitted, 
in part due to constitutional concerns about the ability to apply 
the ban to such arrangements.131  Eigth, anti-avoidance applies—
discussed further below.132  Finally, apart from the shelf-space fee 
ban, the bans do not apply to the wholesale market.133 
A. Background to the Ban 
The ban on conflicted remuneration originated with concerns 
regarding conflicted advice models, in particular the Storm 
Financial model, which relied on one-size-fits-all 
recommendations for clients to borrow funds to invest in market-
linked investments.134  Concerns were also expressed regarding 
the possible role of commissions in the failure of Opes Prime 
 
126 Id. ss 963G, 963H. {Ibid ss 963G, 963H.} 
127 Id. ss 963A, 963J. {Ibid ss 963A, 963J.} 
128 Id. s 963A. {Ibid s 963A.} 
129 Id. ss 963B–963D {Ibid ss 963B–963D}; Draft Corporations Amendment 
Regulation 2012 (Cth) regs 7.7A.4.12–.14 (Austl.) {Draft Corporations Regulations 
7.7A.4.12–7.7A.4.14}. 
130 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.7A, div 5 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) Part 7.7A, Div 5.} 
131 Id. ss 1528–1531 {Ibid ss 1528–1531}; Draft Corporations Amendment 
Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.16 (Austl.) {Draft Corporations Regulation 
7.7A.4.16}. 
132 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 965 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 965.} 
133 Id. ss 963A, 964B. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963A, 964B.} Technically, 
the ban on shelf-space fees does not appear to be restricted to the wholesale market, 
although it relies on a definition only used in a retail disclosure context. 
134 The model relied on rising markets and assumed that this strategy would 
keep working and was therefore appropriate for all clients whatever their 
circumstances. RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 27–30. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 
[3.33]–[3.45], 27–30.} There was also some evidence of inappropriately high property 
valuations to support larger loans. Id. at 35–36. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, [3.66]–
[3.69], 35–6.} The outcome for some clients was not only loss of investments, but loss 
of assets which had been mortgaged to borrow in order to invest. 
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representatives to disclose the higher risk nature of its securities 
lending arrangements.135  One of the terms of reference for the 
resulting Ripoll inquiry was to investigate:  “[T]he role played by 
commission arrangements relating to product sales and advice, 
including the potential for conflicts of interest, the need for 
appropriate disclosure, and remuneration models for financial 
advisers.”136 
The committee concluded that disclosure had not been 
effective in managing conflicts of interest137 and made 
recommendations canvassing banning, which were the 
forerunner of the FOFA bans on conflicted remuneration:138 
6.56  The committee received considerable evidence suggesting 
that the most effective way to improve the quality of financial 
advice for consumers is to remove conflicts of interest altogether 
by banning commissions and other conflicted remunerative 
practices.  The regulation of remuneration practices was 
consistently raised during the inquiry.139 
Recommendation 4 
6.101  The committee recommends that government consult 
with and support industry in developing the most appropriate 
mechanism by which to cease payments from financial product 
manufacturers to financial advisers.140  
 
135 Id. at 66. {Ibid [4.70]–[4.71], 66.} 
136 Id. at vii. {Ibid vii.} 
137 Id. at 81–85, 87. {Ibid [5.53]–[5.68], 81–5; [5.74], 87.} 
138 Other measures were already being taken, including the regulation of 
margin lending as a financial product, making it subject to the financial services 
licensing and disclosure regime and the introduction of consumer credit licensing. 
Additional measures included the requirement to give clients notice of margin calls 
and the obligation on lenders and intermediaries to ensure that credit is appropriate 
for the client. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 985EA–985K (Austl.) {Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) Part 7.8, Div 4A, Subdiv A}; National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 (Cth) ss 115–120, 123–124, 128–133 (Austl.) {National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Part 3-1, Div 4, Div 6; Part 3-2, Div 3, Div 4}. 
139 RIPOLL REPORT, supra note 7, at 116. {Ripoll Report, above n 7, 116.} 
140 Id. at 127. {Ibid 127.} The reference to consulting with industry recognized 
that the then Investment and Financial Services Association (“IFSA”)—now 
renamed the Financial Services Council (“FSC”)—had already developed an industry 
standard to ban superannuation commissions by July 1, 2012. INV. & FIN. SERVS. 
ASS’N LTD., IFSA’S SUPERANNUATION MEMBER CHARTER: A NEW COMMITMENT TO 
SUPERANNUATION MEMBERS (2009), available at http://riskinfo.com.au/ 
news/files/2009/11/091118-ifsa-superannuation-member-charter_final.pdf. {IFSA’s 
Superannuation Member Charter: A New Commitment to Superannuation Members 
released on 17 November 2009.} 
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B. Ban on Conflicted Remuneration 
The Commonwealth government’s response was to announce 
a “prospective ban on conflicted remuneration structures 
including commissions and volume based payments.”141  This ban 
is formulated in the legislative definition of “conflicted 
remuneration”: 
any benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, given to a 
financial services licensee, or a representative of a financial 
services licensee, who provides financial product advice to 
persons as retail clients that, because of the nature of the 
benefit or the circumstances in which it is given: 
(a) could reasonably be expected to influence the choice of 
financial product recommended by the licensee or 
representative to retail clients; or 
(b) could reasonably be expected to influence the financial 
product advice given to retail clients by the licensee or 
representative.142 
The legislation does not expressly ban commissions.  The ban 
depends on this influence test; the circumstances in which a 
benefit “could reasonably be expected to influence” advice are 
critical.143 
There is a presumption that a benefit is conflicted 
remuneration if access to or the value of the benefit is wholly or 
partly dependent on the value or number of financial products 
recommended to or acquired by a client—that is, volume-based 
remuneration.144  However, some volume-based benefit structures 
might not be inherently conflicted.  The Explanatory  
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 Press Release, Chris Bowen, Minister for Fin. Servs., Superannuation & 
Corporate Law, The Treasury of the Commonwealth of Austl., No. 036 Overhaul of 
Financial Advice, (Apr. 26, 2010), http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx? 
doc=pressreleases/2010/036.htm&pageID=003&min=ceba&Year=&DocType. {Chris 
Bowen, ‘Overhaul of Financial Advice’ (Media Release No. 036, 26 April 2010) 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/036.htm
&pageID=003&min=ceba&Year=&DocType>.} 
142 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 963A.} 
143 Id. {Ibid.} 
144 Id. s 963L. {Ibid s 963L.} 
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Memorandum recognizes this and that those involved in such an 
arrangement must disprove the presumption and demonstrate 
that the benefits are not conflicted.145 
Whether a particular remuneration structure is permitted 
seems to depend on the circumstances at the time the benefit is 
given or received.  Factors potentially relevant to this 
consideration include the following: (1) the proportion of the 
benefit to total remuneration; (2) the level of involvement of the 
recipient of the benefit in giving the advice; and (3) the nature of 
the link between the benefit and the value or number of financial 
products recommended or acquired. 
The Explanatory Memorandum states the legislation 
provides flexibility to maintain broadly based performance-based 
remuneration arrangements without compromising advice 
provided to retail clients.  It provides the following example: 
[I]f the benefit was based on the total profitability of the 
licensee, it was on a small percentage of the total remuneration 
of the recipient, [and the recipient was not involved in providing 
financial advice to retail clients] it would be less likely of being 
able to influence the recommendations or advice provided to 
retail clients.146 
The test for conflicted remuneration based on what could 
reasonably be expected to influence advice is an objective test.147  
Case law indicates that “reasonably be expected” is something 
“more than a possibility” but must have “real and substantial 
grounds” for expectation of occurrence.148  It does not, however,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 27–
29. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, [2.18]–
[2.20].} 
146 Id. at 28–29. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, 
Example 2.1, [2.19].} 
147 Attorney-General’s Dep’t v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180, 193 (Austl.). 
{Attorney-General’s Department & Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Cockcroft 
(1986) 10 FCR 180 at 193.} 
148 Id. {Ibid.} 
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need to be “probable.”149  This test is consistent with the change 
from a test of “might influence” the advice, which was proposed 
in the Exposure Draft of the Bill.150 
The context of the advice may indicate that remuneration 
was not reasonably expected to influence the advice and should 
not be “conflicted remuneration.”  This context might involve 
consideration of the level and nature of controls and other 
measures designed to ensure that advice is not influenced by 
remuneration, which could include the following. 
C. Consequences for the Adviser 
The consequences of giving conflicted advice may reduce the 
likelihood that conflicted advice will be given.  Consequences 
could range from a poor performance review, which affects the 
level of discretionary bonus; some form of penalty; naming and 
shaming; termination of employment; seeking to have advisers 
banned by the regulator; or other disciplinary action.  Of course, 
penalties raise contractual law and, where relevant, employment 
law issues regarding enforceability. 
1. Preventative Controls 
The nature and effectiveness of the controls to prevent 
conflicted advice from being given will also be relevant.  For 
example, if advice is reviewed before it is provided to the client 
by someone who does not receive conflicted remuneration, then 
the otherwise conflicted remuneration paid to the “adviser” may 
 
149 In the context of freedom of information applications, it has been held that 
the phrase, “could reasonably be expected” to destroy commercial value or to 
prejudice future disclosure of information, should be given its ordinary meaning.  
This meaning is something that is reasonable and not “irrational, absurd or 
ridiculous.” Further, “it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in 
terms of probabilities or possibilities.” Id. at 190 {Ibid 190}; see also Apache Nw. Pty. 
Ltd. v Dep’t of Mines & Petroleum [2012] WASCA 167, ¶ 60. (Austl.) {Apache 
Northwest Pty Ltd v Dept of Mines and Petroleum (No 2) [2011] WASC 283}; Searle 
Austl. Pty Ltd. v Pub. Interest Advocacy Ctr. (1992) 36 FCR 111, 123 (Austl.) {Searle 
Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre [1992] FCA 241; (1992) 36 FCR 
111, 123}; News Corp. v Nat’l Cos. & Sec. Comm’n (1984) 5 FCR 88, 101 (Austl.) 
{News Corporation Ltd v National Companies and Securities Commission (1984) 5 
FCR 88 per Woodward J at 101} (“A reasonable expectation of an event requires 
more than a possibility, risk or chance of the event occurring.”). 
150 Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) 
Bill 2011 (Cth) s 963(1) (Austl.). {Exposure Draft, Corporations Amendment 
(Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011, 28 September 2011, clause 
963(1).} 
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be unlikely to influence the advice actually given to the client.  
This review may not be practical for some organizations or 
certain types of advice—for example, quick telephone-based 
advice. 
2. Effectiveness of Controls 
A compliance regime with serious consequences for conflicted 
advice will only be effective if it is actually implemented and is 
seen to be implemented. 
3. Cultural Factors 
The ethical environment of the organization is also likely to 
be relevant.  An effective compliance regime requires an 
organizational culture which supports and fosters compliance.  It 
must be actively and visibly supported at all levels of the 
organization and could be undermined in a particular area by the 
attitude of staff or management in that area. 
None of these measures are likely to be enough on their own 
to establish that remuneration could not reasonably be expected 
to influence advice.  A licensee would presumably also need to be 
satisfied that its controls are stronger than the average level of 
controls currently prevalent in the Australian financial services 
industry.  ASIC’s position on the ability of licensees to continue 
to pay remuneration linked to conflicted factors, such as funds 
under advice, by implementing appropriate control measures, is 
currently unknown and will be an important consideration for 
licensees. 
The ban applies both to those accepting remuneration—
licensees and their representatives—and to product issuers and 
employers of representatives paying remuneration.151  The ban on 
 
151 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963E, 963K (Austl.). {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) Part 7.7A, Division 4, Subdivision C.} The ban is a civil penalty provision 
for licensees and authorized representatives—who are generally not employees—but 
not for employed representatives. Id. ss 963E, 963G, 963H. {Ibid ss 963E, 963G–
963H.} Employees are only subject to the ban where the remuneration is not 
received from their employer on the basis that “in the majority of cases it is the 
employer, rather than the employee, that sets the terms and conditions of an 
employment contract [and is] in control of remuneration payments.” Further FOFA 
Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 36. {Further FOFA Bill 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 36, [2.57].} Employees who do 
accept conflicted remuneration from someone other than their employer may be 
subject to a banning order. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963H (Austl.). {Note to 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963H.} Licensees must in any case take reasonable 
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product issuers paying conflicted remuneration may be 
challenging to implement given the definition of conflicted 
remuneration and the presumption that volume based benefits 
are conflicted.  As discussed above, it is a question of fact 
whether particular remuneration is conflicted in the hands of the 
recipient.152  It is therefore difficult for an issuer to assess this 
fact.  It may require issuers to undertake due diligence of 
unrelated licensees to ensure payments received are not 
conflicted—it is certainly likely that appropriate assurances will 
be required. 
D. Exemptions from the Ban 
Exemptions from the ban on conflicted remuneration include 
the following: (1) client “given” benefits; (2) most simple banking 
product advice; (3) most insurance-related advice, subject to some 
important exceptions; (4) execution only benefits; (5) stamping 
fees and brokerage; (6) “soft dollar” benefits worth less than 300 
AUD which are not given frequently or regularly; (7) education 
and training; and (8) information technology software or support 
relating to products provided by the benefit provider.  Each of 
these exemptions gives rise to interesting issues. 
1. Client “Given” Benefits 
There is an exemption to the ban on conflicted remuneration 
where:  “[T]he benefit is given to the licensee or representative by 
a retail client in relation to: (i) the issue or sale of a financial 
product by the licensee or representative to the client; or 
(ii) financial product advice given by the licensee or 
representative to the client.”153 
“Give” or “given” is not defined.  However, doing an act, such 
as giving a benefit, includes causing or authorizing the act or 
thing to be done.154  Consequently, this exemption for benefits 
 
steps to ensure that their representatives do not accept conflicted remuneration. Id. 
s 963F. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963F.} 
152 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963L (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 
963L}; see supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
153 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 963B(1)(d), 963C(e) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) ss 963B(1)(d), 963C(e).} 
154 Id. s 52. {Ibid s 52.} While there is no case law on this provision, 
consideration has been given to “authorise.” In Ex parte Johnson, Chief Justice 
Jordan said, “The word ‘authorize,’ according to its natural meaning, signifies the 
conferring upon a person of a right to do something which, apart from the 
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given by a client can extend to advisers where the client directly 
gives the benefit to the adviser—for example, by paying advice 
fees to the adviser—or causes or authorizes the benefit to be 
given to the adviser. 
The Explanatory Memorandum supports the conclusion that 
the benefit does not need to be given directly by the client.  It 
states: 
‘[F]ee for service’ arrangements—where the client is the person 
paying the adviser—are not conflicted remuneration (even 
where the client pays a volume-based fee).  The provision is 
intended to exclude from the definition of conflicted 
remuneration any fee for service paid by the retail client, 
whether the benefit is given directly by the retail client or is 
given by another party at the direction, or with the clear 
consent, of the retail client.155   
This exemption seems to indicate that Parliament did not 
intend to infringe on a client’s ability to agree to any fee 
structure he or she might see fit.  However, advisers and 
licensees are subject to other duties which will affect their ability 
to propose or agree to particular remuneration arrangements.156 
 
authorization, he does not possess.” Ex parte Johnson (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 16, 18 
(Austl.). {Ex parte Johnson; re MacMillan (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 16 per Jordan CJ at 
18.} “Authorise” has also been considered at length in the intellectual property 
context and has been given a broad meaning. It has been held to mean to sanction, 
approve, or countenance an infringing act. Univ. of N.S.W. v Moorhouse (1975) 133 
CLR 1, 12 (Austl.) {University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1; 6 
ALR 193)} (finding authorise traditionally had the meaning of “sanction, approve, 
countenance”); Corp. of Adelaide v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1928) 40 
CLR 481 (Austl.) {Corporation of the City of Adelaide v Australasian Performing 
Right Assn Ltd (1928) 40 CLR 481; [1928] ALR 127)} (finding authorise means “to 
permit”). The courts have also held that authorization generally requires some 
power to prevent the act, and some actual or constructive knowledge of the act; 
however, express sanction or permission is not required. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd. v 
iiNet Ltd. (2010) 263 ALR 215, ¶ 374–76 (Austl.) {Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet 
Ltd (No 3) (2010) 263 ALR 215; 83 IPR 430; [2010] FCA 24}; Universal Music Austl. 
Pty Ltd. v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 220 ALR 1, ¶ 365–66 (Austl.) 
{Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 
1; 65 IPR 289; [2005] FCA 1242}. 
155 See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 
30. {See Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 30.} 
156 Such duties may include the following: (1) the duty to act in the best 
interests of the client, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B (Austl.) {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) 961B}; (2) the duty to give priority to the client’s interests, id. s 961J 
{Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J}; (3) the duty to manage conflicts of interest, id. 
s 912A(1)(aa) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 912A(1)(aa)}; and (4) the duty to provide 
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The exemption does mean that advisers can still arrange for 
clients to pay fees by deduction from their account without 
infringing the ban.  This fact is important as “dial up” adviser 
service fee arrangements provided by product issuers could 
otherwise be regarded as prohibited “commission” payments. 
There may be difficulties in establishing the client-given-
benefit exemption in other circumstances.  It is a significant 
problem for licensees to remunerate advisers without infringing 
the ban on conflicted remuneration.  Traditionally, advisers have 
received direct or indirect incentives based on the revenue 
received by licensees from the adviser’s clients.  This receipt does 
not cause any particular difficulty where client fees are based on 
hourly rates or flat fees for particular services which are not 
linked to types of financial products. 
However, many licensees and advisers charge clients on the 
basis of funds under advice that is volume-based remuneration.  
In recent times, this formulation is typically product neutral but 
it may still incentivize an adviser to recommend that a client 
invest funds in investments which count toward funds under 
advice, as opposed to paying off debt or investing in other types of 
investment.157  While it is possible to develop proxies for funds 
under management that should not be conflicted remuneration,158 
there are concerns in the industry that such measures mean that 
adviser interests are not fully aligned with business success.  
There is an irony in the balance between client “given” benefits 
and volume-based benefits.  It is possible for the client to agree to 
pay licensees based on funds under advice—which would 
otherwise be conflicted remuneration—but licensees may not be 
able to pay a share of that remuneration directly to the adviser 
who brought in these fees.  One possibility may be to rely on the 
client “given” benefit exemption.  This reliance would involve 
obtaining client agreement for both the fee paid to the licensee 
and for a proportion of the fee to be paid to the adviser.  While 
 
financial services efficiently, honestly, and fairly, id. s 912A(1)(a) {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) s 912A(1)(a)}. 
157 For example, funds under advice typically include managed funds, 
superannuation, and shares—where the adviser is authorized to advise on shares. 
They would not normally include real estate or less traditional forms of investment 
such as artwork. It may not include certain bank account balances. 
158 An example of such a proxy may be the client’s net wealth. This would be a 
proxy for funds under advice as higher net worth clients are likely to have more 
investments, and therefore more funds under advice. 
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such an arrangement may appear unusual, it does seem 
consistent with the purpose of the exemption to give the client 
control over remuneration.  And where a client does obtain such 
control, remuneration is thus being designated as not conflicted.  
This model does have some challenges. 
Simply disclosing the form of remuneration to the client will 
not be enough.  It is clear that FOFA is intended to move beyond 
a disclosure model to cure conflicts and is intended to ensure that 
conflicted remuneration is permitted only where the client gives 
that benefit, subject to other exemptions. 
On the other hand, there does not seem to be any need for 
the arrangement to be negotiable as such.  It should be possible 
for licensees and advisers to set the terms on which they will 
provide services to clients.  If the terms are not negotiable, the 
client’s choice is whether to acquire the services on the terms 
proposed. 
It is easier to conclude that a client has directed that a share 
of the licensee’s fee be paid to the client’s adviser where the share 
is directly specified by the client.  It may be harder to establish a 
relevant “direction or clear consent” where the model is more 
complex and the share of remuneration depends on other factors, 
such as the level of remuneration generated by the adviser from 
all clients or the compliance or quality of advice given. 
As the focus of the exemption is on the individual client, it is 
likely that the test is a subjective one for each particular client.  
If so, the adviser and the licensee would need to be satisfied on 
an individual basis that the client has “given” the benefit. 
2. Banking and Insurance Products 
A number of different exemptions apply to banking and 
insurance products which are mainly, but not entirely, carved out 
of the prohibition on conflicted remuneration.  They apply for a 
variety of reasons.  However, the government’s fear that such 
exemptions will be misused has led to complex exemptions which 
make it difficult for the industry to rely on them. 
It is important firstly to recognize that the ban will not apply 
to all financial products as that term would ordinarily be 
understood.  The financial services regime in Chapter 7 of the 
Australian Corporations Act only applies to certain kinds of  
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financial products and services, and in particular does not apply 
to credit products, including home loans, personal loans, and 
credit and charge cards.159 
The FOFA Act provides the following product related 
exemptions: (1) benefits given solely in relation to general 
insurance;160 (2) monetary benefits given solely in relation to life 
insurance, other than certain forms of life insurance available 
through superannuation;161 (3) benefits given to banking 
representatives solely in relation to basic banking products.162 
These limitations appear designed to ensure they cannot be 
taken advantage of to circumvent the general prohibition.  This 
approach is not particularly logical given the anti-avoidance 
measure which has also been included in the regime, as 
discussed below.  It also means the exemptions are viewed as 
impractical in many situations as most advisers advise on a 
range of products. 
The exemptions are cast very narrowly and it appears they 
cannot be combined.  This narrow approach to the exemptions 
creates difficulties where advice is given on a number of topics or 
where joint products are issued.163  The government responded to 
 
159 “Financial product” and “financial service” are defined in divisions three and 
four of the Corporations Act. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 763A, 766A (Austl.). 
{Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 763A, 766A.} Credit facilities are excluded. Id. 
s 765A(1)(h) {Ibid s 765A(1)(h)}; Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) reg 7.1.06 
(Austl.) {Corporations Regulation 7.1.06}. 
160 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963B(1)(a) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 963B(1)(a).} 
161 Id. s 963B(1)(b). {Ibid s 963B(1)(b).} The exclusion does not apply to non-
monetary benefits, for which there is no explanation. However, the existing 
FSC/FPA Industry Code of Practice on Alternative Forms of Remuneration in the 
Wealth Management Industry applied to life insurance, so presumably the 
government did not want to water down existing restrictions. See FIN. SERVS. 
COUNCIL & FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, FSC/FPA INDUSTRY CODE OF PRACTICE ON 
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF REMUNERATION IN THE WEALTH MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY 2 
(rev. 2010). 
162 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963D (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 963D.} “Basic banking product” includes most savings, transaction accounts, and 
term deposits; associated non-cash payment facilities, such as check and payment 
facilities; and traveler’s checks. Id. s 961F {Ibid s 961F}; see also id. s 761A {Ibid s. 
761A} (defining “basic deposit account,” a type of basic banking product). 
163 An important example is consumer credit insurance which, in Australia, 
frequently comprises both a general insurance and a life insurance policy sold in 
tandem. The Corporations Act provides that not only must access to or the amount 
of the benefit be solely dependent on recommending a basic deposit product, but the 
adviser, in the ordinary course of giving that advice, must not give advice on any 
other financial product. Id. s 963D(c). {Corporations Act s 963D.} 
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concerns regarding these exemptions by proposing further 
exemptions.164  These proposals provide more flexible exemptions 
for banking and insurance products,165 yet they still retain 
restrictions which have the potential to artificially limit their 
usefulness.  In particular, the new exemption for banking 
products permits benefits relating to banking products, general 
insurance, and non-financial products,166 but does not permit 
advice to be given about any other product “at the same time.”167  
This approach invites uncertainty about when an adviser can 
advise a client on other products.  Intermingled advice can 
obviously not be given.  However, questions remain as to whether 
the same adviser can complete giving advice on a particular 
product and then move on to giving advice on another product 
without infringing the conflicted remuneration ban. 
There is a problem for life insurance as a result of the 
exclusion from the exemption of certain types of life insurance 
made through superannuation.  This ban arises from the 
government’s goal to prohibit commissions taken from 
compulsory superannuation account balances, including in 
relation to life insurance made available through 
superannuation.  After intense debate, the government agreed to 
limit the ban to superannuation members who do not seek or 
require advice on their superannuation insurance benefits.  The 
concern was that otherwise the regime would, in fact, create a 
new conflict for advisers.168  The government has attempted to 
address this problem by limiting the ban to default and group 
insurance arrangements, but this attempt has not fully resolved 
the industry’s concerns.169 
 
164 Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) regs 7.7A.4.12, 
7.7A.4.13 (Austl.). {Draft Corporations Regulations 7.7A.4.12 and 7.7A.4.13.} 
165 For example, benefits relating to combined general and life insurance 
products will be permitted. Id. reg 7.7A.4.12. {Draft Corporations Regulation 
7.7A.4.12.} 
166 This term is not defined but is understood to include loans. 
167 Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) regs 7.7A.4.12, 
7.7A.4.13 (Austl.). {Draft Corporations Regulations 7.7A.4.12 and 7.7A.4.13.} 
168 As commission can be paid on life insurance acquired directly by clients, 
different remuneration outcomes would arise depending on whether an adviser 
recommends acquiring life insurance directly or through a superannuation fund. 
169 This non-resolution is because group insurance arrangements through 
superannuation can include both automatic cover and cover underwritten by the 
insurer where, therefore, advisers are typically involved. 
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3. Execution-Only Benefits 
There is no need for an execution-only exemption where no 
financial product advice is ever given to the client.  This is 
because conflicted remuneration is banned only where benefits 
could reasonably be expected to influence advice.  FOFA does not 
apply to remuneration that influences investment decisions 
where no advice is given.  Providers of retail investment 
mandates or managed discretionary accounts, as they are known 
in Australia,170 are only subject to the ban on conflicted 
remuneration if they also provide retail advice.  Furthermore, the 
ban only applies to advisers and their licensee—it does not apply 
to remuneration received by associates.171 
However, there is a risk the ban could apply to licensee 
remuneration where the licensee is responsible for both advice 
and investment decisions.  There are also concerns where an 
adviser performs execution-only services for a client at a later 
date. 
FOFA addresses these concerns by including an exemption 
where a benefit is given in relation to the issue or sale of a 
financial product to a person by a licensee or representative and 
no advice has been given about that product or similar products 
by the licensee or representative in the twelve months before the 
benefit is given.172  The government said the following of this 
exemption: 
This is proposed to avoid a situation where a licensee or 
representative can never receive remuneration of an execution-
only type if it has ever provided financial product advice to the 
retail client.  Where the financial product advice is remote with 
respect to the issue or sale of the financial product—that is, it  
 
 
 
 
170 AUSTRALIAN SEC. & INVS. COMM’N, REGULATORY GUIDE 179, MANAGED 
DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNT SERVICES 3 (2004), available at http://www.asic.gov.au/ 
asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ps179.pdf/$file/ps179.pdf. {Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission, Managed Discretionary Account Services, Regulatory 
Guide 179, March 2004 (‘ASIC Regulatory Guide 179’) at 3.} 
171 The duty to give priority to client interests requires advisers to place client 
interests ahead of those of associates, but this duty also only applies “when giving 
the advice.” Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961J(1) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 961J(1).} 
172 Id. s 963B(1)(c). {Ibid 963B(1)(c).} 
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took place over 12 months before the issue or sale—it will not 
deny the licensee or representative the benefit of paragraph 
963B(c).173 
This exemption applies only to the issue or sale of a product.  
It does not apply to the acquisition, redemption, or variation of a 
product.174 
4. Brokerage 
Possibly in recognition of the limitations of the execution-
only exemption, the government has proposed an exemption for 
sharing brokerage fees175 with broker representatives.  The 
benefit must not be more than 100% of the brokerage fee, the 
brokerage fee must be value-based, and the provider must be a 
market participant and have anti-churning arrangements in 
place.176 
However, the proposed exemption has problems.  First, it 
applies only to representatives of market participants—it would 
not, therefore, be possible to share brokerage fees with other 
licensees or financial planners who refer clients to the broker.  
Second, it applies only to brokerage fees calculated by reference 
to the value of the product traded—however, dollar-based 
brokerage fees can also be conflicted remuneration where they 
may influence a recommendation to trade securities.  Third, 
there are concerns about the requirement for “anti-churning 
arrangements,” which require arrangements to ensure that the 
size or frequency of transactions entered into by a provider for a 
retail client is appropriate, and that the provider takes into 
account the investment objectives, financial situation, and needs 
 
173 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Further Future of 
Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth) para 1.11 (Austl.) (emphasis removed). 
{Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to Corporations Amendment (Further 
Future of Financial Advice Measures) Bill 2011 tabled in the House of 
Representatives, [1.11].} 
174 The exemption will not, therefore, apply in the following circumstances: 
(1) the purchase of a share on a stock exchange; (2) the redemption of a managed 
fund or superannuation interest; and (3) the variation of a product, for example, 
switching between investment options or increasing the sum insured. 
175 “Brokerage fee” is defined as a fee based on the value of the product traded, 
which is given by a retail client to a provider in consideration for the provider to 
deal, on behalf of the retail client, in a financial product that is admitted for 
quotation on a prescribed Australian or foreign financial market. Draft Corporations 
Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.12(7) (Austl.). {Draft Corporations 
Regulation 7.7A.4.12(7).} 
176 Id. reg 7.7A.4.12(6). {Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.12(6).} 
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of the client.  As trades are often conducted in a no- or limited 
advice context, it will be difficult for brokers to satisfy this 
criteria. 
5. Stamping Fees 
There is a proposed exemption from the ban on conflicted 
remuneration for fees—known as “stamping fees”—paid by a 
company to a financial services licensee or authorized 
representative for raising capital or debt on its behalf.177  The 
exemption is proposed to address concerns that the conflicted 
remuneration ban would otherwise have an adverse impact on 
the ability to raise capital in the Australian market.  It has been 
welcomed by industry, particularly as it is not limited to broker 
representatives but extends to both “direct and indirect market 
participants.”178 
However, the proposal to restrict the exemption to companies 
is unduly restrictive and would create anomalies in Australia’s 
capital markets, leading to an inappropriate bias towards 
corporate fundraising activities to the detriment of fundraising 
activities relating to other types of entities, in particular, trust 
structures.  There is no tangible reason why the stamping 
exemption should not apply to benefits given by other forms of 
listed entities and there are many good commercial reasons why 
a company is not the appropriate vehicle for a listed entity.179 
The limitation appears to reflect a concern by the 
government that permitting the exemption to apply to trusts, 
which is the normal structure for managed funds in Australia, 
would mean that the exemption could have unintended 
consequences.  However, the exemption is restricted to listed 
entities, which would prevent its application to many investment 
trusts. 
 
 
177 Id. reg 7.7A.4.12(4). {Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.12(4).} 
178 Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 30–
31. {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 31, [2.29].} 
179 It is common in Australia for property and infrastructure assets to be held 
through a listed trust such as a real estate investment trust (“REIT”). The units of 
such trusts may or may not be stapled to the units of another trust or the shares of 
one or more companies, thereby becoming a “stapled security.” 
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There is also a specific exemption for listed investment 
companies,180 which could equally apply to listed trusts to achieve 
the government’s apparent objective of excluding managed 
investment schemes which primarily invest in other schemes or 
securities.  However, one problem with the proposed limitation is 
that both listed companies and trusts invest in other financial 
products in the form of securities and interests issued by 
subsidiaries and special purpose vehicles.  If read strictly, it 
could mean that the exemption is rarely or never available. 
6. “Soft Dollar” Benefits 
The ban on conflicted remuneration applies to both monetary 
and non-monetary benefits.181  While some of the above 
exemptions only apply to monetary benefits,182 the following 
additional non-monetary benefits are permitted: benefits of less 
than 300 AUD, provided identical or similar benefits are not 
given on a frequent or regular basis;183 benefits which have a 
genuine education or training purpose relevant to the provision 
of financial product advice to retail clients—this purpose must be 
the dominant purpose unless it is a training course, conference, 
or seminar, in which case the lesser of seventy-five percent of the 
time spent on the course or six hours a day must be spent on 
educational or training activities for professional development, 
and the participant or his or her employer must pay costs 
relating to travel, accommodation, functions, and events;184 the 
provision of information technology software or support related to 
the provision of financial product advice to retail clients in 
relation to the financial products issued or sold by the benefit 
 
180 Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.12(5) 
(Austl.) {Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.12(5)} (providing that the exemption 
“does not apply if the company has the primary purpose of investing in financial 
products”). 
181 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 963A.} 
182 The exemptions for life insurance, execution-only services, and brokerage 
and stamping fees do not apply to non-monetary benefits. 
183 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963C(b) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 963C(b)}; Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.13 
(Austl.) {Corporations Regulation 7.7A.13}; Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum, supra note 33, at 24 {Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum, above n 33, 24}. 
184 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963C(c) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 963C(c)}; Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.14 
(Austl.) {Corporations Regulation 7.7A.14.}. 
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provider185—the exemption only applies to product providers and 
not generally to licensees responsible for advisers on the basis 
that: 
such benefits would not generally be provided in circumstances 
where they could reasonably be expected to influence advice.  
However, IT software and support benefits provided by 
licensees will be prohibited if they could reasonably be expected 
to influence advice, for example, where the benefit is provided 
as a reward for product sales.186 
These exemptions carry forward the existing exemptions in 
the industry code of practice on alternative forms of 
remuneration.187  They further demonstrate the theme of 
replacing principles-based regulation with greater prescription as 
the translation of this industry standard to statute has led to a 
more restrictive regime for “soft dollar” benefits.188 
 
 
 
 
185 Corporations Act 2011 (Cth) s 963C(d) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 963C(d).} The example provided of such a benefit is “the provision of software to 
access a platform or access to a website to place orders.” Further FOFA Bill Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 34. {Further FOFA Bill Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 34, [2.44].} 
186 Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 34. 
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 34, [2.45].} 
187 See generally FIN. SERVS. COUNCIL & FIN. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 161. 
{FSC/FPA Industry Code of Practice on Alternative Forms of Remuneration in  
the Wealth Management Industry<http://www.fsc.org.au/downloads/file/FSC 
Standards/14S_Jan_2010_JointCodeofPracticeonAlternativeformsofRemuneration.p
df> accessed 18 September 2012.} 
188 In particular, the restrictions on education and training-related benefits 
exemption seem to demonstrate the government’s distrust of the industry. There 
was discussion of imposing further restrictions to limit the exemption to courses and 
conferences in Australia or New Zealand, but free trade concerns seem to have 
stayed the government’s hand so far. There are also concerns about the requirement 
in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 963C(c)(ii) (Austl.) {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 963C(c)(ii)} that the benefit be “related to the provision of financial product advice.” 
This requirement appears to preclude training relating to dealing activities or 
general business management and development unless a broad view of “related to” is 
taken. 
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E. Shelf-Space Fee Ban 
The legislation prohibits platform operators189 from accepting 
“volume-based shelf-space fees.”190  A benefit is presumed to be a 
volume-based shelf-space fee if the benefit, or its value, depends 
wholly or partly on the total number or value of a product 
issuer’s financial products to which the custodial arrangement 
relates.  The purpose of the ban is “to capture benefits provided 
in return for a greater number or value of the funds manager’s 
financial products about which information is to be included on 
the platform.”191 
There are exceptions if it is proved that all or part of the 
benefit is either: 
(a) a reasonable fee for a service provided to the funds manager 
by the platform operator or another person”; [or] 
(b) [a discount or rebate] the value of which does not exceed an 
amount that may reasonably be attributed to efficiencies gained 
by the funds manager because of the number or value of 
financial products in relation to which the funds manager 
provides services to the platform operator, or through the 
platform operator to another person.192 
While these exceptions have been welcomed by the industry, 
they pose technical difficulties.  The only service provided by a 
platform operator is normally the right to be included on the 
platform—hence the term “shelf-space fee.”  This exception seems 
either to be available only where other services are also provided, 
or where the fee is “reasonable,” which presumably means 
consistent with other such fees paid to other product issuers or 
by other platform operators.  However, the government states the 
following: 
 
189 These are products through which clients can acquire a range of other, 
sometimes wholesale, products. Platforms are typically available to retail clients in 
Australia only through financial planners. Commercially, platforms can be purely an 
administrative arrangement or can include a custodial element where products are 
held on trust for clients. The shelf-space fee ban only applies to the latter as a result 
of the definition of custodial arrangement in section 964. While this term is typically 
used for retail offers, the ban itself does not seem to be limited to such offers but 
appears technically to apply to platforms available only to wholesale clients as well. 
190 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964A (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 964A.} 
191 Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 38. 
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 68, [2.64].} 
192 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964A(3) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 964A(3).} 
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The Bill establishes a ban on the receipt by platform operators 
of volume-based benefits to the extent that such incentives are 
merely a means of product issuers or funds managers 
‘purchasing’ shelf space or preferential positions on 
administration platforms.  However, the Bill does not purport to 
ban fund managers lowering their fees to platform operators (in 
the form of scale-based discounts or rebates) where such 
discounts or rebates represent reasonable value for scale.193 
. . . . 
In cases where the scale discount or rebate exceeds the 
reasonable value of scale efficiencies, it is considered that the 
benefit is intended to gain a placement on a platform or 
preferential treatment on a platform (for example, a position on 
a ‘model portfolio’ or ‘menu selection’).194 
In relation to the second exception, it is not clear that most 
product issuers do in fact gain any efficiencies by gaining access 
to clients through platforms, except to the extent that it is 
significantly cheaper to distribute products through platforms 
than directly to clients.  Quantifying such “efficiencies” is likely 
to be challenging.  The government simply indicates that “the 
relative bargaining power between the particular funds manager 
and the platform operator” can be taken into account.195 
The ban only applies to platform operators accepting such 
fees.  It does not apply to the product issuer paying the fee. 
F. Ban on Charging Asset-Based Fees on Borrowed Amounts 
There is a further important ban in the FOFA legislation.  
As noted above, the collapse of Storm Financial and its financial 
model was a significant reason for the introduction of the new 
regime.196  There was evidence that clients were advised to 
borrow significant sums, which were not appropriate to their 
circumstances.  As Storm Financial fees and the remuneration of 
its advisers were based on funds under advice, there was a 
significant incentive to recommend high levels of gearing by 
clients. 
 
 
193 Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 37. 
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 37, [2.61].} 
194 Id. at 38. {Ibid 38, [2.66].} 
195 Id. {Ibid 38, [2.67].} 
196 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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Subsequent credit regulation has rectified the issue to some 
extent by imposing an obligation on lenders to assess whether 
the credit provided is not unsuitable for the client.197  However, 
FOFA takes one step further by banning a licensee or 
representative who provides retail advice—personal or general 
advice—from charging an asset-based fee198 on a borrowed 
amount used or to be used to acquire financial products by or on 
behalf of the client.199 
The ban will not apply if it is not reasonably apparent to a 
prudent adviser200 that the amount has been borrowed.201  The 
government gives the example of the client who deliberately 
conceals the fact that the funds are borrowed.202  However, the 
adviser remains responsible for making reasonable inquiries to 
obtain complete and accurate information.203 
 
197 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) pt 3-2, divs 3–4 (Austl.) 
{National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) Part 3-2, Divisions 3 and 4}; 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 985EA–985K (Austl.) {Corporations Act Part 7.8, 
Division 4A, Subdivision A}. However, these provisions apply to loans for personal, 
domestic, household, or residential investment property purposes, and margin loans 
respectively. Other investment loans are not currently regulated. National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) s 5(3) (Austl.). {National Credit Code 
s 5(3).} The government has issued a consultation paper which, among other things, 
sought submissions on whether other types of investment loans should be regulated. 
See THE TREASURY, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, NATIONAL CREDIT REFORM: ENHANCING 
CONFIDENCE AND FAIRNESS IN AUSTRALIA’S CREDIT LAW—GREEN PAPER 49–56 
(2010), available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1852/PDF/National_ 
Credit_Reform_Green_Paper.pdf. {‘National Credit Reform—Enhancing Confidence 
and Fairness in Australia's Credit Law’ (Green Paper, July 2010).} 
198 Asset-based fee is defined as “dependent upon the amount of funds used or to 
be used to acquire financial products by or on behalf of” the client. Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) s 964F (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964A.} 
199 Liability for breaching the ban attaches to the licensee where its 
representative charges the fee, unless they are an authorized representative. Id. 
ss 964D(2), 964E. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 964D(2), 964E.} Authorized 
representatives are not normally employees of the licensee. 
200 A prudent advisor is a person with a “reasonable level of expertise in the 
subject matter of the advice” who exercises care and objectively assesses the 
information. Id. s 964H {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 964H}; Further FOFA Bill 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 39 {Further FOFA Bill 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 39, [2.73]}. 
201 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 964D(3), 964E(2) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) ss 964D(3), 964E(2).} 
202 Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 33, at 39. 
{Further FOFA Bill Revised Explanatory Memorandum, above n 33, 39, [2.73].} 
203 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 964D(5), 964E(4) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) ss 964D(5), 964E(4).} 
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G. Grandfathering 
Each of the elements of FOFA have their own 
grandfathering measures.204  The regime for conflicted 
remuneration is, however, currently very unclear.  The 
legislation appears to grandfather any remuneration paid under 
a remuneration arrangement entered into before commencement, 
whether it relates to new or existing clients.205  Yet, there is 
currently no grandfathering for payments made by platform 
operators.206  There is a proposal to limit grandfathering so it 
does not apply to investments made by new or existing clients 
after the licensee’s FOFA commencement date;207 however, this 
regulation is yet to be made.  It is also understood that some 
form of grandfathering will apply to payments by platform 
operators, however this measure is yet to be released for 
consultation.  The position regarding grandfathering is, 
therefore, currently very unsatisfactory and significantly affects 
the ability of industry to implement the necessary changes to 
comply with FOFA. 
V. ONGOING FEE ARRANGEMENTS 
The third limb of FOFA is regulation of ongoing fee 
arrangements between advisers and clients.208  These 
requirements come from a different direction than the conflicted 
remuneration ban which is primarily about payments received by 
advisers and licensees from product issuers and employers.209 
 
 
 
 
 
204 In the case of the best interests duty, this grandfathering is very limited. 
205 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1528–1529. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
ss 1528, 1529.} The ban on asset-based fees charged on borrowed amounts applies to 
all fees charged after the licensee election date or July 1, 2013, whichever is later. 
Id. s 1531. {Ibid s 1531.} 
206 Id. s 1528(1)(b). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1528(1)(b).} 
207 Draft Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (Cth) reg 7.7A.4.16 (Austl.). 
{Draft Corporations Regulation 7.7A.4.16.} 
208 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.7A, div 3 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) Part 7.7A, Division 3.} 
209 The main exception is the ban on charging asset-based fees on borrowed 
amounts, which applies to both commission and client fee arrangements. 
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The focus here is on arrangements where personal advice is 
provided and fees are to be paid for more than twelve months.  
This applies to a fee “however described or structured.”210  One-
off fees and payment plans are not affected unless they form part 
of an ongoing fee arrangement.211 
This limb addresses remuneration received from clients, 
although it may not be confined to this.  The provisions do not 
explicitly state whether they apply to fees received from other 
parties or whether commissions and similar types of payments 
can be viewed as “fees.”  The language refers to “under the terms 
of the arrangement, a fee . . . is to be paid,”212 without specifying 
that the fee must be paid by the client rather than a third party 
such as a product issuer.  In any case, client “given” benefits, 
which are exempt from the ban on conflicted remuneration, will 
be subject to the ongoing fee arrangement obligations. 
It is unclear whether this regulates trailing commissions, 
which are undoubtedly arrangements for the payment of 
remuneration for more than twelve months.  There are 
arguments that they are not regulated as ongoing fee 
arrangements.213 
 
 
210 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 962A(1)(c), (2)(c) (Austl.). {Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) ss 962A(1)(c), 962A(2)(c).} 
211 Id. ss 962A(1)–(3). {Ibid ss 962A(1)–(3).} While the regime only applies if the 
arrangement includes a fee which is to be paid during a period of more than twelve 
months, the disclosure obligations appear to apply to all fees payable under the 
arrangement, including one-off fees and fees paid under a payment plan. 
212 Id. ss 962A(1)(c), (2)(c). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 7.7A s 962A(1)(c), 
962A(2)(c).} 
213 An ongoing fee arrangement with a retail client is where a fee is to be paid 
under the terms of the arrangement. Id. ss 962A(1), (2). {Ibid ss 962A(1), 962A(2).} A 
trailing commission must be disclosed to the client who may agree to its receipt. 
However, it is paid under an arrangement between the licensee or adviser and the 
product issuer, and not under the arrangement with the client. Furthermore, the fee 
disclosure statement only has to disclose fees “paid . . . by the client.” Id. 
s 962H(2)(a). {Ibid s 962H(2)(a).} It is not clear whether this arrangement is in line 
with the government’s view. While the Explanatory Memorandum does not refer to 
commissions in relation to division 3, the Minister’s second reading speech stated 
the following: “Some clients are unaware of the amount of [ongoing] fees and 
continue paying them because they are disengaged. This scenario can arise both 
where the advice fee is paid via a third party product commission, and directly from 
the client to adviser.” Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 
Oct. 2011, 11797 (Bill Shorten, Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Financial 
Services and Superannuation) (Austl.) (emphasis added). 
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The following requirements apply to ongoing fee 
arrangements: (1) clients must be provided with an annual fee 
disclosure statement;214 (2) clients can opt out of the ongoing fee 
arrangement at any time;215 (3) clients must be provided with a 
renewal notice every two years;216 (4) the ongoing fee 
arrangement will automatically terminate if the fee disclosure 
statement or renewal notice requirements are not met217 or two 
years and sixty days after the previous renewal notice, unless the 
client actively renews the arrangement.218 
A. Fee Disclosure Statements 
Fee disclosure statements must include the following: (1) the 
amount of each fee paid by the client under the arrangement219 in 
the previous year; (2) the amount of each fee that the current fee 
recipient anticipates that the client will pay under the 
arrangement in the next twelve months; (3) information about 
the services that the client was entitled to receive from the 
current and any previous fee recipient under the arrangement 
during the previous year; and (4) information about the services 
that the client actually received during the previous year.220  The 
fee disclosure statements must be given within thirty days after 
being prepared.221 
B. Renewal Notices 
The renewal notice is required to contain the following 
prescribed statements: (1) the client may renew the arrangement 
by notifying the current fee recipient; (2) the arrangement will 
 
214 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 962G (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 962G.} 
215 Id. s 962E(1). {Ibid s 962E(1).} 
216 Id. ss 962K, 962L. {Ibid ss 962K, 962L.} 
217 Id. s 962F. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 962F.} Payment of a fee after 
automatic termination does not waive the effect of non-compliance. However, the fee 
recipient is not required to refund such a payment unless required by court. See id. 
ss 962F(2)–(3), 1317GA. {Corporations Act 2001 ss 962F(2), 962F(3) and 1317GA.} 
Charging a fee after the arrangement terminates for any reason is, however, a 
breach of a civil penalty provision. Id. s 962P. {Ibid s 962P.} 
218 Id. ss 962L(2), 962N. {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 962L(2) and 962N.} 
219 The provision uses the term “ongoing fee.” However, this term is defined as 
any fee payable under an ongoing fee arrangement without specifying that the fee 
must be paid over more than twelve months. Id. s 962B. {Ibid s 962B.} 
220 Id. s 962H(2). {Ibid s 962H(2).} 
221 Id. s 962H(1)(b)(i). {Ibid s 962H(1)(b)(i).} 
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terminate, and no further advice will be provided or fee charged 
under it, if the client does not elect to renew the arrangement; 
and (3) the client will be taken to have elected not to renew the 
arrangement if the client does not give the current fee recipient 
notice in writing of an election to renew within thirty days after 
the renewal notice and fee disclosure statement is given to the 
client.222 
A last minute amendment to the regime gave ASIC the 
power to provide an exemption from the renewal notice obligation 
and therefore the requirement for clients to opt-in every two 
years where the fee recipient is bound by an ASIC-approved code 
of conduct.  ASIC will only approve a code for this purpose if 
ASIC is satisfied “the code of conduct obviates the need for 
persons bound by the code to be bound by the opt-in 
requirement.”223 
The inclusion of this provision in the legislation was 
controversial and was thought at the time to favor certain 
industry bodies over others.224  There has not been much 
indication either at the time or subsequently of what such a code 
will be required to contain.  Speculation that ASIC would in any 
case require a code to contain equivalent provisions initially 
seemed misplaced based on the Minister’s statements at the time 
the amendment was made.225  However, more recent statements 
by ASIC suggest that this view may be correct.226 
 
222 Id. s 962K(2). {Ibid s 962K(2).} 
223 Id. s 962CA. {Ibid s 962CA.} ASIC is undertaking a review of REGULATORY 
GUIDE 183, which sets out ASIC’s approach to approving codes of practice. 
224 See, e.g., Press Release, Ass’n of Fin. Advisers, Tricky Politics Blight FOFA 
Reform (Mar. 22, 2012). {For example, see Association of Financial Advisers, ‘Tricky 
Politics Blight FOFA Reform’ (Media Release, 22 March 2012).} 
225 The Minister, stating when tabling the amendment, that it “gives ASIC the 
ability to exempt advisers from the opt-in obligation if they are satisfied that the 
adviser has signed up to a professional code which obviates the need for opt-in.” Cth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 Mar. 2012, 4043 (Bill Shorten, 
Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation and Minister for Employment 
and Workplace Relations) (Austl.). {House Hansard, 22 March 2012, 4024.} 
226 Peter Kell, Comm’r, Australian Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, Speech at the 
Association of Financial Advisers National Roadshow, Brisbane (July 26, 2012), in 
ASIC’S FINANCIAL ADVISER WORK FOR 2012–13, at 10 {Australian Securities and 
Investments Commissioner Peter Kell, ‘ASIC’s Financial Adviser Work for 2012–13’ 
(Speech delivered to the Association of Financial Advisers National Roadshow, 
Brisbane, 26 July 2012)} (“As for ‘obviating the need’ for opt-in, we expect approved 
codes to contain provisions that will achieve substantially the same outcomes as the 
opt-in requirement intends to achieve. That is, we expect to see engaged clients who 
receive agreed services for any ongoing fees that they pay.”). 
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VI. ANTI-AVOIDANCE 
The FOFA reforms introduce an anti-avoidance prohibition 
which applies to the obligations in part 7.7A.  Section 965 states 
that a person must not enter into, begin to carry out, or carry out 
a scheme for the sole purpose or for a purpose—that is not 
incidental—of avoiding application of any provision of the new 
part 7.7A of the Act, and the scheme has achieved this purpose.227 
This anti-avoidance measure has some significant challenges 
for the industry.  It is very strict.228  The measure applies not 
only to entering into or beginning to carry out a scheme but also 
to carrying out the scheme.229  This application may mean that 
steps taken before the commencement of FOFA may still be 
impugned under section 965 if the scheme is carried out after 
commencement.230 
There are also concerns that structuring activities to fall 
within an exemption may be enough to fall afoul of the 
prohibition.  This conclusion does not seem reasonable.  However, 
it demonstrates the uncertainty created by the provision, 
particularly as it is possible to imagine circumstances where 
structuring to fall within an exemption should be regarded as 
avoidance. 
It is also important to recognize that while some elements of 
FOFA do not commence until the earlier of a licensee electing to 
comply or July 1, 2013, the anti-avoidance measure commenced 
on July 1, 2012.  This means that while arrangements entered 
into after July 1, 2012 may be legal currently, they may still 
breach the anti-avoidance measure if a purpose is to avoid the 
application of FOFA after July 1, 2013. 
 
227 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 965 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 965.} 
228 Extending the prohibition beyond sole or dominant purposes to non-
incidental purposes makes this anti-avoidance measure stricter than the equivalent 
tax anti-avoidance provision. 
229 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 965 (Austl.). {Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 965.} 
230 The equivalent tax provision specifically carves out schemes entered into 
before the commencement of the provision. 
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CONCLUSION 
The FOFA reforms are disappointing for both consumers and 
the industry—although from different perspectives.  Central to 
both is the lack of clarity of a number of provisions.  The problem 
from a consumer protection perspective is to ensure that 
intervention in the market forestalls the kinds of commission-
driven selling of inappropriate products and eventual collapse of 
investment schemes.  Industry requires clarity so that it 
understands its compliance obligations.  The public policy 
imperative is to ensure that Australians are able to accumulate 
and maintain savings and investments for retirement with 
appropriate financial advice.  The principle-based approach of the 
unreformed legislation did not prevent market failures in the 
advice industry and loss to individuals.  The question is whether 
the regulatory scheme was the cause and whether the FOFA 
regime will do any better.  By prescribing the steps that can be 
followed to achieve the best interests of the client and by 
prescribing priority to the client in the case of any client, the 
legislation sets out a path towards good advice.  Certain practices 
are proscribed and banned.  Advisers can no longer receive 
conflicted remuneration.  But we have seen that the lack of 
clarity in these provisions means that although remuneration 
models will change, the change may not be as radical as some 
advocating for the retail client may have hoped. 
The bottom line is that regulation is only as good as its 
enforcement.  ASIC has expressed concerns about its regulatory 
powers and these concerns have been addressed.  Prescriptive 
and proscriptive regulation is generally perceived by regulators 
as being easier to enforce than principle- or risk-based 
regulation.  However, no form of regulation will prevent market 
failure or fraud.  Prevention requires active, informed, and 
empowered enforcement coupled with an effective regulatory 
regime—one that is both flexible enough to respond to market 
changes and specific enough to provide certainty.  There is a 
significant question whether Australia’s FOFA regime meets this 
test. 
 
 
 
